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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
Chaucerian scholars invariably note and com.'1'lfl~:t 
upon the poet's interest in the problem of divine foreknowledge 
and human free will. Some of their number~ namely, H.R. Patch~ 
w.c. curry, and espeoia lly B.L. Jefferson, in his Chaucer and 
the Cpnsolat1on of Pbj.losophl of Boeth1wt1 have studied with a 
degree of thoroughness the passages in Chaucer's poetry in 
which interest is displayed. The present writer, however, 
believes that a more detailed and more aoc<:.rate tren tment of 
the matter can be made by examining the views expressed by the 
poet not only in the light ot Boethiuats De consolation& 
Philoaophiae, but also with reference to the patristic and 
scholastic teaching which influenced directly or indirectly 
the minds of Chaucer and his contemporaries. To ma.."!.!:e such an 
examination is the purpose of this thesis. 
Since Chaucer' a pr1.lc1pal sou.rce tor his observa-
tions on foreknowledge and tree will is Boethius, the thesis 
will bet;in w1 th a au· 'l'l1&r'1 and an elucidation ot the latter• s 
views as contained in the .fifth book of the De consolat1one. 
Then will follow auccess1vely an explanation of the two chief 
passages in whi.·h Chaucer deals with the subject, namely, 
that of Troilus and Or1aezde (Book IV, 11. 953-1078), and 
that of the Nun•a Pr1eat•s Tale (11. 3234•3250). subsequentlz 
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Jt1 /-
there will be eiven a reawne ot the .>atriatlc and scholastic 
teachin touci;ing {;he problem togetJ1er with un expos1 tion of 
chaucer's attitude toward that teachinc. This method of procedure 
should result in !~"aking more intelllp;ible the passages ln 
chaucer• s wr1 tinge o! which tllere la question. In the .following 
chapter, therefore, the aolu..tlon of Boetb1ua will be ".resented. 
In the third chapter the Troilua passage will be d1acuaaed, and 
in the fourth tt• pertinent linea of the Nun' a Priest• s Tale·. 
The fifth chapter will give the patriatic and scholastic answer, 
end the sixth will put !'crward certain conoluaiona whi0h the 
writer has .formed in the course of h1a study. 
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CHAPTER II 
The sollltt or ur aoethius 
Anieius Manlius severinus Boethius 6 a -Roman statesman 
and philosopher, was born at Rome in the year 480, and died at 
Pavia in 524 or 525. He was descended from a consular tam117• 
As early as 507 he was known as a learned man, and as such was 
entrusted by King Theodoric with several important m1ssio: a. 
When, however, his enemies accused him of dialoyalt7 to the 
Ostrogothic king, allegtng that he plotted to restore "Roman 
liberty6 " and adding the accusation or aacril•g• (the practice of 
astrology), he was cast into prison, condemned, and executed b7 
order of Theodoric. During his 1rnpr1aonment he reflected on the 
instability ot the favors or princes and the inconstancy of the . 
devotion or his friends. '1' '6S8 reflections suggested to hir;'l the 
theme ol' his beat known ph1loaoph1cal work, the De Conaolatione 
Ph1loaoph1ae. 
By the eighth centUJ7 a trac11 tion, 1t'h.1ch became con• 
stant, that one reason for his condemnation was his catholic 
Fa! tl11 had as awned de.f'1n1 te shape. In recent times or1 tical 
scholarship baa e.:one to the opposite extremeJ and it baa been 
held that Boeth1us was not a Christian at all, or that, 1! he was, 
he abjured the Faith before death. A saner view, 1t'h1ch seems at 
the preser;t time to be prevalent among aoholara, 1s that Boethiua 
was a Christian and remained a Christian to the end. It 1s not 
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easy, however, to show from document~y sources that he died a 
martyr for the Catholic Faith; nevertheless value should be r;:ive.n 
to the constant tradition that he did. 
He produce': works on mathematics, music, philosophy, 
end theology. His philosophical works exercised very groat in-
fluence on the development of medieval terminoloey, method, and 
doctrine, especially in logic. In fact, the schoolmen, down to 
the beginning of the twelfth century, depended entirely on Boe~1ua 
for their knowledge of the doctrines of Aristotle. They adopted 
his definitions and -ade them current in the schools. 
The best known work of Boethius is the De Consolatione 
Philosophiae, which was written during his imprisonment. It is a 
dialogue between "Philosophy" and Boethius, in which the Queen of 
Sciences strives to console the fallen statesman. The main 
argument of the discou1·se is the tra:nsi toriness and unreall ty of 
all earthly greatness and the superior desirability of the things 
of the mind. There are ev1 dent traces of the influence or· lteo-
Platonists, especially Proclus,.and little, if anything, that can 
be said to reflect Christian inf'luenoes. The recourse to sto!ciam, 
especially to the doctrines of Seneca, was inevitable, cons1dering 
the nature of' the theme. It astonishes us that he should have 
failed in his mome.n t of trial and stress to refer to obvious 
Christian sources of consolation. rprhaps he felt that a strict-
ly formal dialogue such as the De ConED latione should adhere 
rigorously to the realrr of "naturi.l truth," and leave out of con-
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Cbr1st1anity~ •supernatural t1PUth.• 
'lhe work ta.lcB a up many problema of metapbya1CJJ as 
well as of e~11cs. It treats of the being and nature of God- ot 
providence and fate, of the origin of the universe, and of the 
freedom of tbD will. In medieval time a 1 t became one of' the moat 
popular a d influential ph1loaoph1oal books, a favorite study o~ 
atatesmen, poets, hiatoriana., philosophers, am theol.ogiana. Ita 
1ntluenoe may be traced in much of the literature of the Middle 
Ages. That the De Consolat!one waa a favorite study of the theo~ 
logiana aa well as· of the 11 ter&IT men is evidenced by the ~­
oua imitations under the title •De consolation• ~heologiae• which 
were read widely dur1ne the later Middle Agea.l 
Now that we have considered these f'ew facta about 
the life and works of Boethiua, we are ready for the main labor 
ot the present chapter, a aumm~ and an elucidation of the F1tth 
Book of the De conaolat1one Ph1loaofh;1ae. HoweveJ:', before th1a 
matter 1s talcen up snec1:fically, a somewhat general sm:rrary ot 
the whole Fif'th nook would aeem to be helpful. ~'heretore, .,.r 
aome necessary introductory detaile, th1a general a'lllllm8.ry 1111. 11 be 
given. ~t first let us oonaider the introduot017 details. 
The disciple lies a1ok in his prison bed, and a noble 
and beautiful woman. the I.,ady Philosophy, 1e at hie bedside 
inatl'U.Oting and ooneoling him. In their conversation she sh.owe 
that what men think to be chance 1s nothing more than the action 
6 
ot hidden causes, and that this action does not proceed from the 
'willa 0'£ men but from God, Who wills it and guides its course. 
This explanation prompts the disciple to aal<: whether or not 
providence in Ria prearrangement of the action of all causes 
holds the world in tbe grip or necessity, so that there can be no 
free will. The lady anawera by proving that man has a free will. 
She goes on to say that there are de{~-;reea or free will, and that 
men destroy it when they sin. While speakinc ot sin, she ren• 
t1ons tho d1 vine foreknowledge of men' a sinful volunt&rJ acts, 
and by so doing raises a great difficulty in the vind of the dis• 
ciple. He etates his d1 ficulty. He cannot understand how free 
will in man can be reconciled wit.h the foreknowledge 1n God. Thua 
he opens up the subject of the Fifth Book, the reoonc11iat1on or 
manta free will w th the divine foreknowledge. With this ex-
position of the introductory matter, the general suunary of the 
Fifth Hook can now be ~iven. 
Believing his difficulty to b'e unsoluble, the dis• 
ctple now proceeds to give his reasons f'or thinking so. It 
should be noted well that in the whole of his argument he is ever 
anxious to defend the foreknowledge of God. To him the question 
is not, "Can the divine t'oreknowledge be reco~1ciled w:t th rr·ee 
Will in man?" but rather., can human tree will be reconciled wl th 
the forelmowl'edge or Godt" The d1 vine f'oreknowledge must be 
4efended at all coat, even i.t it require the denial ot .tree will. 
In the cnurae of his reasoning he also considers a eer,ta1n 
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aolut1on of the problem offered by other philosophers ac\jerding to 
which free will is reconciled with d1 vine foreknowledge. :&:his 
aolut1on he holds to be unsound. Jte concludes by commenting on the 
sad state 1n which mankind is 1!' there be no tree Will. 
It 1s now Lady Ph1losoPb7' s tUJtP. to speak. ~h.e 1'1rst 
She first t'efutea thoroughly the arguments ot the disciple. 'this 
done, she proves to be sound the ac lution to the problBm 'Vhich he 
had rejected, and finally enters into a long explanation ot it. 
Her explanation concludes the Fifth Book. IJ.he forecoing, then, 
11 a brief, general summary of that part of the De consolat1one 
in wb1rm we are presently intereated. we are now ready to take up 
the various argumenta of the Fifth Book in more detail.! 
The disciple begins by putt1nr; forth his proposition: 
human free will 1s incompatible wi ti the foreknowledge of God. 
Proceeding to his proof, he says that his propos1 tion ia true if 
two principlea are true, first, that God foreknows all things, 
and, secondly,by that God cannot be deceived in what He knows, i.e. 
cannot have false knowledge. Assuming that these principles are 
self-evident, the disciple continues. He points out that ac• 
cording to the first principle all the acts of mc•a tree will 
must be &rnown by God, and that aocordifl.g to the second He cannot 
have false foreknowledge about theae acts. Next the disciple 
atatea that if a man did have tree will, God could not have 
certain knowledge of h1a future tree will acta, but only 
"uncertain expectationa."3 The disciple gives no proof for thia 
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assertion her_~, but puts it off until :rmch latar in h1a ap•ech. 
For tb.e :.:resent he merely makes the assertion, and draws a con-
clusion frmn it as if it were true. This conclusion is that it 
would bo "impious" of' us to attribute to r.;.od the possibility of 
having "unoerta1tl eXJ;eotationa" (aa men have oonoern1ng the 
future). It would be so because it would violate the principles 
already- put forward. It would violate the :t'irat, because 1 t 
wo·~lld not lmow all thingaJ for if I a.rn uncertain about the outcome 
of some event., I cannot be said to know ita outcome. It would 
-
violate the secori.d 1n that it wa1ld a.dmi t the poss-ib1li ty of God 
havivtg talae lmowledge of future free will actsJ for if I have 
only "uncerta1n expectations" about aometh1ntj1 it is possible that 
rq Judgement about its outcome be false. 
The 41ac1ple' a next atep ia to consider an adver•&r7' a 
attempt to reconcile free will w.t th the divine torelmowledge, in 
order to refute the latter• s arguments. Before expatiating on 
this matter, let un return to the d1aoic}le• a lmproved assertion 
that "i.f man had tree will, God could not have certain :roz-e• 
knowledee of his tree will acts, but onl.J' •uncertain expeota• 
tiona." Aa we have alread7 etated. the d1ac1ple puta off the 
attanpt to prove this aaaert1on until later in his speech. How-
the 
ever, the preaent stage 1s more logical place for this "proot", 
and as it is basic t~ th~ whole position of the d1aolple, it will 
be given here. 4 
pUt briefly, the proof is thiru God would have 
:.,tain to Nlmowl!W;e of a thing 1lb ioh of 1 ts vecy nature 
uncertain, and this would be false knowledge. ( By "oerte.in" 
g 
1s meant abE~olute certaint;r, not a high degree of' probability.) 
On tl:e one hand, God must have certain foreimowledJ:e of future 
treo will acta-- the two principles laid down at tlie beg1n.nir..g, 
ne.m.::1ly, that Ood must Jmow &1.1 things, and that this knowledge 
IDWit not be talae knowledge, requ1re divine cartitu.de concerning 
free w1 11 acts-- and on the other Be must have certi tud.e about 
a thtng which of 1 ta ver'1 ne. ture 1a uncertain, a tree will aot. 
Th1a apparent contradiction 1& what the disciple of'fara as tJ1<"! 
bed-rock f"ounda.t1on for hia whole poai t1on. It 1s the vecy 
heart of h1s line of argument. If man had free w111, his free 
will acts as f.;ture things would be un, erta1n in their outcome. 
The essence or free will 1s the powet• to choose between two nr 
more poas1U1l1t1ea. It is uncertain how a man will choose until 
the time comes wten he actually makea his choice. Hence, 1f God 
~oreknew with certitude that He wou~a eventually make a choice, 
such foreknowledge would be false. M7 choice of A instead of B 
does not become a certain truth ~t11 halt•paat r.dne otclock of 
the morning of the second da../ of March, 1938, at which time I 
actually cho'oae A· Al.l ai:Jng tbrough the thoua&l:lds of past years 
until now, it is just as poaa1ble that I shall choose B as A· 
It 70u w1 sh to be certain how I shall aot ln a g1 ven c1rcum-
atance, you must walt unti 1 I actually act. eue 4oea the 
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diaoiple ci ve reasons for his basic assertion. 5 Let us now take 
tb.~ disciple's speech wi1ere we left ott, namely, where he begina 
to consider an adversary's attenpt to reconcile tree w1~1 with 
God's foreknowledge.· 
The adversary' a arg·.; .. -·ncnt is this, that thinrf!f do not 
ooae to 1J&.ss because God f,)reknowe them, but God foreknows them 
because they will como to pass. The disciple's position, ac-
oordln(; to the assumption of the adversary, is that an act or 
the will which God fore1(Rows must come to pass because He fore-
mows it. God's very .foi'Eiknowledge of th~ act creates the 
mceasi ty o.f the act• e coming to pass. 'l'ht' adversary argues that 
this view is incorrect, since the aot doe3 not at all come to 
paaa because God foreknows 1t, but on the crmtx-ary, God tore• 
knows it because it will come to pass. 
The advex-sary is concerned With finding out where the 
causality or the necess~ty is. He knows that the cause can onl7 
be in two plaeea: either it is the foreknowledge of God, so that 
.;; 
this foreknowledge causes the neceasi t:, of future thiv.ga happEm• 
ingJ or on thct contrar;r, 1 t !a the i'llture events themselves, ao 
that they cause a kind ~~r neceas1 ty- in the foreknowledge of Ood, 
the necesa1 ty or God }"l..av!:ng foreknowledge of them. By coming 
into ,existence they make it necessary that God fbr eknow tha:m. 
Wi tb this reasoninp; in mind the adversary lays down hi a 
propoa1 tiona It is not necessary that those things happen which 
are :f'nreaeen by G,od, but necessary that God foresee those thi11.,;;q;a 
ll 
wh1ch are to come J or to put it un<>ther way, things do not corl1!l 
I 
to paas because Providence :t'oreaeea them, but Providence foresees 
them because they will come to panh VJ1 th this r.;roposi tion the 
advert~ary believes that he can save tree will. 
The disciple replies to this argumentation by alleg• 
ing that it is not to the point. .Admittedl7, the necees1ty 1a 
oauaed by the foreknowledge of God, or 1 t is caused (in a aenae) 
bJ the future event. But, eo the diaciple says, the question at 
issue is not v,tJere the nece::H'i ty is; that is beside the point, 
FUrther, it makes no difference where the cause is; tor wherever 
it is proved to be, foreknown things must ha;;pen ot necessity. 
He can tully adm1t his advers~ry•s proponition, and still prove 
hla own thel1a. Thia he labors to do by means of the example ot 
a man sitting. In this example one kriows an event that is taking 
plaoe in the present time before onera very eyes. The d1ao1ple 
otte't'a this example, although dealing w1 th the present, aa a 
perfect parallel to God's foreknowledge ot a future event. 
A man is s!ttinr; there before me. Since he is 
a1tt1ng there, 1 t is necessary tut m:r judgment that he ai ts be 
true, so tar as my example is in perfect acc;.)rd w:. t;h the propoai• 
tion of the adversarj. An event ex1ats. That event cauaea 
neceea1 ty in rq knowledge of' it: :first, the naoessi ty o.f me 
having knowledge of it (it is before me, I am attentive to it, I 
cannot help but know it); and secondly. the necessity of r:tt 
knowledge of it bein£ true. Therefore, the causality is all on 
the side of t.h.e event. ·Just as the adverafl.r'Y can sa:r it is 
',_0811ary that G·od foreknow a th:lng becat\se 1t 11111 e.xiat,so I 
can say in this case 1 t 1s necessary that I know this event 
beeauae it exists now. 
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l.)ut I can also reverae the ;)rocess. If i1fl' knowledge 
s.s true, and true necessarily, 1 t is also necessary that the man 
11t there. Therefore, I know the man eita there of' necessity. 
I a1n certain of 1t. nut does 1113' knowledge cause that neoeasit,., 
xot at a.ll1 And oo ! ful:t~ill the oth1:1r ·part of the advers&rJ' a 
proposition. As the event of the tuture does not of necessity 
exist because God torek' ows 1t, so this event o! the present doea 
DOt exi. at of' necess1 ty because I know 1 t now. 'J.'hua I hs.Ye ·in 
this exar.1ple agreed perteot1,- with the adveraaey. and yet :trom 
it I oa.n prove that foreknown things 1m.:tst happen or necessity. 
When all 1s said and done, rq knowledge of the an a1 tting there, 
1lh1ch is neceaaar•ily true knowledge, tells me that the :man muat 
-
be sitti11g there. I am positive 1t is necesaa.r:r that he be 
ai tt1ng· there. 
A few linea further on the disciple applles the ex• 
ample to the foreknowledge of' future eventa. "Aa when I know 
anything to be- 1t must beJ so when I know anrthing shall be, it 
muat needs become.•6 Aa when I know a man alta, ait he muat ot 
naoaaal ty 1 so it I know he wtll sit in the future, he must ot 
naceeal ty sit 1n the future. He baa not the teee w:tll to avoid 
11 tting in the tuture, neoeaai ey f'oro1nt:r him to ai t, K7 tore• 
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knOwledge of the event ia true, and true or nece~sity; therefore 
I can argue that the event itself must happen of' necessity. It 
it does not, my foreknowledge or it is false. But God must know 
all things, past, present, «nd future, and His knowledge of theae 
IIUit be tr-:.le. To conclude what muBt be a~dd on the application 
ot the example, .. mat is true of 1rt1 knowledge of a present or 
tuture event ia equally true of Oodt s knowledge of a preae•·,t Ott 
tuture event. The adversary haa attempted to reconcile the tree 
will of man with the foreknowledge of God by the proposition, "It 
1a not necessary that thin s come t:.o pass beea,;;se God foreknows 
them, but 1 t is necesea%7 that God foreknow them because they will 
come to ~.:.ass. The dise!ple has shown that even 1f this proposi-
tion be true, the fact rremains that fr'lreknown things must come to 
paaa. 
'.;:hus far the d: so 1ple has be~m merely de.tend1ng his 
poa1 t1on against the adv81 aary. Bow he ta:,,~es the off'ensive. The 
adYeraary cl,.,larly w1 shea to say that :tuture events cause the tore• 
knowledge or God, in the tl .. ue aense ar "-.he word "cause•·11 
The d~. se1ple olttime 1 t is "absurd" to say that temporal event~ 
ehould be said to cause God• s everlasting foreknowledge. The 
dieoiple does not tell ue vlhy 1 t is "absurd," but from lt'hat Lad7 
Ph1loaoplq says abon t this later on, his reason pl~obably 11 that 
it the foreknowledge were caused by tu::ure even te, 1 t would depend 
on them, because cauaal1 ty i:mpl1ea desJendo:,:ce-. But the veey idea 
•aod." il~Jpl1es absolute independence .from all other :..,e:tnga J hence 
it 1a "absurd," that is, 1 t is a contradlct:t or: 1n te~~ma, to say 
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that t.JJe forek;::l.O'Wledge of s .ch an absolutely independent being 
8:r.ould depend on temporal events. 7, 8 
~ith this the dlaciple leaves the adversary aa en-
t1rely refutad 1 an.d offers the argument for his own position, 
earlier as fl tting lr>gioally there rather than here where the 
disciple actually puts it. lbis argumemt ia the basis of h1a 
whole posl tlon. and 1 t is very i't'l..vOrtant for t.he understanding ot 
that pos1 t1on. It is tlle argument that if man had tree will, God, 
in order to foreknow his .i"ree wi;l acta, would have to haYe cer• 
ta1n foreknowledge of a thing which of 1 ts very nature r:ust be un• 
oerta1n; in this hypotr1es1e God's Corekllowledge wo;.;ld be talae. 
After givir:tg this argument the d1ac1ple considers that he has 
proved su!'t'iclently that tree will cam,ot be reconciled with 
God' e foreknowledge. He concludes hie speech by enumerating the 
woetul conaequences whi;.::h muat follow 1£ man baa no tree will. 
/ 
There can be no reward for virtuous conduct, or punishment tor 
eY11 coit0uot. There cannot even be a di.fference between virtue 
am vice. furthermore, if there could be a1n, GOd would. haYe to 
be the author of it. since all things happen of neoeaei ty' bJ the 
will of Him V'Jho prearransed manta eve7 w.tll action.,. LastlJ, men 
could not hope in God, and 1 t would be useless t.o prq to Him. 
From tl'..1s it would .follow that all mankind would be separated 
trom Him, since 1 t is hope and grace alone that bind men to God. 
It is onlY' after she hae listened to the long die• 
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cour•• of the disciple that Lady Philosopq begins to express 
her v1ews.9 The whole difficult,y in this matter, according to 
her, is that we do not understand the way in which God knows 
thins•• If we did have this understanding, we would have no 
trO\ible in com.prehending how God toreknowa tuture things, and how 
oontequently tree will can be reconciled w1 th the divine tore-
knowledge. Later she will explain ()Od'a intellect insofar as it 
ia hum&nlf possible. In the meantime she will clear up the 
1peoial difficulties proposed by the disciple. 
Lady Philosophy first asserts that the position or 
the adversary, which the disciple rejected, is indeed the correc.t 
one. Be it recalled that the advers817' s solution to the prob.lem 
waa that things do not came to pass of necess·ty bec.use God tore-
mows them, but Pe necessarily knows them because they will come 
to pass. She goes on i.;o consider the ditticul ty, proposed by the 
disciple, of the man si tt1ng. In putting tort·; this example the 
diaciple admitted that foreknowledge did not at all cause the 
neceasi ty or t'ut:.;re acta, but held that it indicated as a sort ot 
aign the presence or the necesa1tr. The Lady meeta this ditti• 
oulty with two anawera. The first is that one must prove the 
eziatence of the neceaa.;.tJ betore proclaiming &l'J1th1ng as a sign 
ot ita existence. (One might justlJ question the probative toroe 
ot this reaaon.) The second anawer is that we should argue 
rather from intrinsic causes trom signs. (The Lad7 designatea 
arguments from signa aa •tar•tetched" argumenta. )10 Thus she 
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reeponds to the d1sc1ple•s argument from the example of the man 
li tting• 
wow the Lady goes a step turther. She says that the 
di•ciple has only one difficulty a ainst the adversary• a princi• 
ple (later she will Show there are two important errors, one 
depending upon the other, bur·ied beneath this difficulty). '!'he 
41eciple's d.If'ficulty consists in his thinking that tree will is 
repugnant to foreknowledge or its own acts. - I.t' .Lady Ph1lost;>pb1 
oan ahow there is no repugnance, the disciple must accept the 
principle. Her method of proof is to art::ue from a parallel ex-
ample. She will tiret demonstrate there is no repugnance in the 
exietence of tree will aots and a simultaneoua knowledge ot' thea. 
She will then make the proper application to foreknowledge o.t' 
tuture tree will acts. 
Lady Philosophy regards as selt•eYident the existence 
ot tree will acta which we can know While they come into being 
before our very ,eyes. One might indeed ask her how she can take 
eu:ch tree will acta for granted, when the whole question urder 
debate is Whether or not human free will exists. Let it be said 
in her defense that the exietence of God's foreknowledge is never 
doubted. The point at issue 1a whether or not this foreknowledge 
negatives the possibility or human tree will. Now the disciple 
has no desire to deny the existence or tree 11111, Hie d1tt1oulty 
liea in the reconciliation of it w1 th a known truth. 'l'his truth, 
the tact or God's foreknowledge, haa been established earlier in 
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th• D• consolatione. l'he diactple is quite willing to admit the 
esiatence of human tree will, if demonstrably it is not repug• 
nant to the divine foreknowledge. The lAdy is perfectly juati-
t1.e4, therefore, in considering tree will a self-evident truth, 
1f she can remove the ap,;;-.rent contradiction or its coexistir..g 
with God'• foreknowledge. 
Lady Philoaop~ argues from the example of a coach-
man driving his horaea. His actions are tree, and I know them to 
be IUCh. I cannot argue trom the knowledge I have or the11, as 
troa a s1 gn, to neoeasi ty in them, ( aa the disciple has done 1n 
tbe case of the sitting aen), because the Lady has already re• 
jeoted that line o:r.argument as tnvalld. Consequently, here 1a 
a case in wh1oh free will can stand with a knowledge of ita acts. 
Jow as free will acts are not repugnant to this present knowledge 
ot the!ll, so tuture tree will acta ,. re not repugnant to fore• 
knowledge of thet.lh The parallel, eo the Lad7 alleges, is perfect. 
Waturally enough, the disciple objects strongly. He 
denies theparallel, and he denies it on accou1t ot that basic 
reason behind his whole poai tion which the wrl ter made eo much of 
1n treating the disciple's own apeecb. His reason, it wi\1 be 
reaembered, was that if God foreknew th• event of' some tree will 
aot, that foreknowledge would be talae, since a tttee will is of 
1 te very nature uncertain, and uncertain th1 :-.ga cannot be known 
w1 th oerti tude. There· 1a no u.ncertainty eoncern1ng the ac te of 
tbe coachman, for I behold thea coming into being before mr eyes. 
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From a great number 01. possiole lree acts tl1e ariver has now 
aelected particular ones. Before he made his selection~ it was~ 
cerU1n which he would choose, but now that he has made his choice 
all uncerta nty has vaniShed. Real things, i.e., free will acta, 
ooae ir ..to exiaterLCe, ar.d I car.~. know them wit. all certainty. But 
tbe oaae is quite different with tuture free will acts and fore• 
knowledge or thelll• A man haa not 7et made hie actual choice. It 
1a ur..certain what he will choose until the 1ntervenine time goes 
b7 and the moaent comes when he actuall7 makes .h1a choice. Then 
onlJ can hls act be the object ot certain knowledge. If before 
that time I have foreknowledge of it, rn:r forelmowledge is false, 
since t~e object of it ia a tb1ng whose very nature it 1a to be 
uncertain in ita· 1asue. Hence there 1a no parallel between knowl• 
edge of present free will acta and foreknowledge of tuture tree 
will avts. 
Nothing daUb.ted, the Lady replies that though free 
will acta are admi ttedl,- uncertain in themael.fea, nevertheleaa 
the7 can be foreknown w1 th ce-etitude. The disciple' a error, ahe 
points out. lies in his bel1ev1Dg that th1ne;a are known 1n ac-
cordance w1 th their natures. In actual truth the7 are known ac-
cording· to the tacul ty knowin{; them. Of th1a assertion she g1 v~a 
the following proof. cona1der, she aa7a, aome knowable object. 
In itself, acool'Cl1ng to ita own nat·ure, 1 t 1a 1nd1vidual. con-
crete, and present to ua. In the scale of.' baing, ranging trom 
the lowest tJP• of animal all the way up to the higbeat 1ntel• 
leotual being (God), there are fol~ kinds or knowing faculties. 
First t1~,era is mere sense faculty, capable only ot sense 
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knowledge of o·cll' object, arid that only when the object 1.s present. 
secondly, there is imagination, which also '·aA but se~'lae 
knowledge of the object, but which has the added power qf knowing 
the object when 1t is abaent. so tar we have two faoult1ea which 
are lim1ted to the. sensible, the singular, and the concrete. The 
third faculty, man's intellect, can lmow our object 1n the 
abstract, i.e., it can have universal knowledge or it. The fourth 
and highest faculty, that ot God, has powers. of knowing the objeo' 
tar above those peeuli&r: to the human intellect. .Thus each of the 
four tacult1es knows one and the same object, but d1.fferently 
trom the other three, and in a manner peculiar to ::.. ta own nature. 
All this goes to show that a given object is not known according 
to ita na tUl'e, but ace 'rding to the na tlll'e of the tacul t,- knowing 
1t.ll Therefore the d:1.eciple car11:ot reject the parallel on the 
ground that a future tree will ·act is by 1 ts ver'f nature uncertain 
1n its !a sue, and so precludes all certain .forelmowled· ·e of 1taelf. 
Jltevertheleaa, rejoins the disciple, it ia aeltevident 
that men cam·.ot have certain knowledge of uncert':in .future event1 
euoh as tree will acts are. This waald be againat the nature ot 
the human faculcy. Thus reaaoning, he still deniea the parallel. 
Lad7 Ph1losoph:7 admits t.."lat men cannot ha.ve certain t~>reknowledge 
ot future events uncertain in their issue, since this is beyond 
'he natural p·owera of the hlll"n&.n .intellect. B~:t it ia otherw1ae 
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with God· His intellect is of such perfection that it can have 
certain forelmowledf;e ot events uncertain in their issue, i.e., 
of tree ~~.:1.11 acts. This peculiar power she calla the "si~plic1tT' 
of the divlne knowledge. It we could understand this "aimplic1t7", 
we co·<tl(.i also unc:tersta:n.d how Cod ia able ·.:.o l.1.a·. e cel•ta1n fore• 
knowledBe of events uncertain in their issue. She will now 
attompt to ex}.JlL·ln this elmpllc1 ty, and b7 so doing will solve 
the disciple's last difficult,. against her "parallel." Thia done, 
ahe w11J h~ve removod the last prop of th.o d1 sciple• t.::: contention 
that human frr:H1 will cannot co-exist VIi th d~.v1ne fO!'eL"nowled(:;e. 
she will nl~:1o Levo re.fv.ted ent1recy his ob.1ect1ons against hia 
adversary' 8 l11<<flfl.O;r.t 01' 80lV1ng :t;.i'w &1Ji/8l"ent contrac.Hotion in Cree 
will eru:l forelt:nowledge, - against the use ot the pr:J.no1ple1 
"things do not of necessity dome to pase because God foreknows 
them, but c~od of neeeeai ty must foreknow them because they will 
oome to pas~.;." 
After some remarks on o~r matters, Lady Pllilosophy 
proceeds to treat ot the eimpl1c1ty o.t ~Tot:. In order, however, 
to understand the divine flimpl1c1ty, one nmst have some notion 
of the "eternity" of God. 1his eternity o.f God alle def!I:;.es as 
•• PE~r:feet pos~.HUJB1on altogether or an ondloss l1f~h" 12 The 
meanint, of tho det1n1 t1on becomes clearer if we consider tempor·al 
tblnga • A ter:poral thing cannot embrace all the ::;;pace of' 1 ta 
Ute at once, ae can the eternal beirl(\• l'he life of tem;.,.,oral 
be1nge can be divided into three sect1o: a_. present., past, a.'P)(l 
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ruture· .:; f·res<:r t section 1s that lite alone which :t t really 
6 8 • its past life has gone forever, ita future lite baa poaaeas.... , 
not yet come. 'l'he eternal being, on the contrary 1 does posse sa 
ita past and f'uture lite, and that together with its present lite. 
The tact o:f ti1e aatter is that 1 t does not have a paat or .future 
lite, but only life 1n the present, and this present ia ever• 
laatine• \Vloat _is present to men is a ~hort fleeting moment, what 
11 present to God 1a everlasting. Thus does the Lady explain her 
4ef1n1t1on ot eternity, i.e., ftthe perfect poesession altogether 
ot an aadloss 11te.ft 
She now connects t!'..e idea. ot etern.tt7 with the DiVine 
intellect. If (Todt s nature 1s eter:nal., it .follows the.t :Hie 
intellect ll'Jlst be eternal. As Godt a li.fe has no past or tutt.1re, 
wt only an everlasting present state, so :·lso F1s intellect.· He 
does not lrnow things as past, present, and .f'utt..u'e, but as present. 
God' a intellect lmowa two bod1ea r;f truth, J!ia own everlaat1ne 
Ute, ana th.e 111'e of ')emporal th1rlfl8• As the dit11na 111 ltnown tt.a 
ao•th1ng which is entirely 1n a present state. so tefll)oral th1np:8 
are known as someth1ne enti:r·ely in a present state, althoue)l 
'eaporal tl1i~~• actually have a present and future state as well 
•• a present state. For exaq>la. a. : an YI111 live eig)•ty years. 
Be Will havo performed in that ti:, e a great n.umber ot actlone. 
At preaGL, t he is onl.7 fort:r years of ace. At tho present he ie 
P8r1'orm1ng certain actions. God knowa theae present action::-. 
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. 'l'hef ~e, as tie Lady would put 1 t, "now 1n doing," and God 
13 JasOWI. them as such. But in the forey years past he has also 
pert,:'l'med actions, and 1 n the forty years to come he will perf'orm 
1110r 4h God knows these past and future actions. nut how? As ot 
the past and as ot• the future! No. He knowa them as 11' they 
were. present. Re knows them, to repea't the words of Lady 
Pb11oaopby, "as· if thq were now in do1ng." 
In this Whole Da"G"&er· we are bot greatly concerned with 
. man"' s past and present actions. We wish to .find out about his 
tuture actions. How doee God roreknow theae tuture actions? ne 
knOWs them "as 11' they :w&N now 1n doing." Really it is 1nooM"ect 
to talk o.f the foreknowlec:Ute ot· una. ne drHta nut have rortknmfl• 
ge, but rather the knowle~e 01 a newtT" .!"adin~-, present. All 
the foregoing has been tor tlle purpose of explaining the 
"s1mp11city" of Ood'a knowledge. we can now define this 
"s1mplic1 ty" as the power to know the pae t ani future as 1i' 1 t 
were.the same as the present. aa 1f the past and the tuture were 
now in doipg• It 1a this s1mpl1c ley which &114lblea God to know 
Our future free Will &0 tS With Certi tud,t: 1 tal thOugh theSe in 
themselves be events uncertain 1n their issue. Since God•a 
intellect has such a power, the c1.1so1nl.et a last reason for 
denying the pazell.el between our knowledge ot a coachman• s tree 
will acts and God's foreknowledge ot'tuture free will acts falls 
flat. :Further, the Lad7' a explanation of the a1mplic1 ty of God' e 
intellect has brought out h9w ats-Udng that p_.allel 1e. !Joel's 
torelalowled[.t;e is just aa much a lmowledge of something going on 
in the present as 1a our knowledge of tho present itself. IJ8dy 
pbilosophy has completed her argument from. the example of the 
ooaoblna::"'11 lberefr")m she haa proved that ther•e is no contradiction 
between .free will and God t a t orekr&OWledge. Ther·e remains, how• 
eYer, so;~ obseur1 ty which must be removed• some ob jec t:tons which 
111111t be answered. 
The disciple can argue in th1e manner: r;od foreknowa 
tree will acts 'ltlich some day m. l"! actuall~.- con1e to p~t.ss. Since 
tmch is the case. lily cannot I still argue thnt "vhat God tore-
knows will happen. and what actually wi 11 happen, must happen. 
and is therei"ora necessfU'7? The T,ady grants the existence or a 
necessity, bn.t denies tl.tat this necessity destroys free will. 
The will act referred to the divine knowledee is necessary, but · 
in itael.f 1a entiztely tree. She explains this statement by her 
distinction between conditional and simple necessity. (Aa we 
shall see, Chauoett mentions both types ot necessity in the 
WUn•s Priest•• Tale.) 
·when the ao t is r eterred. to the divine knowledge, 1 t 
1a necessary with conditional neceaaity. 14 ~~t does this con-
41 tional. neeessi ty mean? we ca."l understand 1 t better by takint; 
the example or a man Who is walking bef:>re us, supposedly of h1s 
free will. If I know that he is walldne.:, he must or neeessi ty 
be wal.kingJ tor, as LaCly Ph1losoplq observes • "wl.tat a man kJ:,oweth 
cannot be o~" than it is known." The man. is lmown to walk. 
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Therefore, walk he must, but his walkifltt:; is necessary only con• 
d1 t1onallY - by the condition of my lmowledge. Conseque~tly, 'llf1' 
owled{se 1 s the conr·\ t tion. And so 1 t 1 s w1 th the foreknowledge · 
of God and our tree .-rill acta. God by virtue of the s1mpl1c1 toy 
ot his r~~reknowledge Imow• the aot as if' 1 t were happening in the 
ps-eaent before h1mJ therefore 'it must needs take place. 
The next step is to inform the diaciple how thia 
eondit1onal neeesm1cy is compatible w1 th free will. If I know 
a 11811 1e wall~~-n[,", that I!W1 must be walldn;:·.- because lmowJ:,edge does 
notl:J.i11g more thnn mirror real! ty. BUt before the man aet out be 
Jdght not Lave vm.J.ked. While the men WPlka. it is neoeaaaey that 
be walk; but be.f")re he eet ou·:.; it was not necess&r'J' t'Jlat he should 
wallc. ny ·the pO\Yer of his own free will the man b:roUBht the act 
ot bla walk~ .. rl(;; :tnto existence, am by r;ivi"S 1t existence made it 
neoeaaar:n for all (~xiat1ng th1nes have a neoeeAi t;r. Thus it was 
b7 his own £roe w:1.ll that he coni" erred necess1 ty on this act. 
O.e ~ act cane into e:xistenoe it was necessary that it exist. 
But it ttenended on man' a volition whether' or not it shoWld ac-
tulN the quality of nocess1t.r. i.e., come into existence. As a 
•tter or fact, the man actuallT hae· determined to bring it into 
ala\enoe ·QnC!, Bod tore!mlm that He woulcb In thts eense only it 
la aeoeesaey that w11at God foreknowa happen. Thua does r.,ady 
Pld.loaopey explain con~~u. t1onal necese1 tv. 15 
v 
Bosidea th1 a cond.1 tional neoess1 ty there is anothe:r 
.~~Sat · .. with which free \dll 1s not compatible. and th.1.~ ie 
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•as..ple" necess1 ty. A cood oxrunple :>f simple necessity is the 
aun rtaing. or its risinc we cannot say, "1t mi~,ht not have 
bappened," and "there was no neoeos1ty tr.at 1.t rise." Before it 
roae, the sun had to rise; there was no free choice in ~1e nmtter. 
such 1a the nature of simple necessity. It ls really simple 
neoeas1ty that the disciple has been deferdlng nJ.l along. 
wow the r~ady is :full.7 prepared to meet the d1.ff1oulty. 
ood torelmowa men' a free will actsJ therefr::J:ro t~~e;J must happen of 
neoeas1ty. she makes a distinction. Th~~r~'" f'r·yl w:~.11 note must 
happen with cond1 t1ona.l necemsi ty, yes. T1·l~7f r:-r '~~t happen with 
aimple neoessl ty, no. Cod fore1mows bot:h Um t tb:~ sun will rlse 
on a g1 ven morning in the year 1940, and tl:~.t o~ the same ~n.o"t"ning 
a m~n will so out walk1 • The man will 'Vflt lk with oor..di tiona.l 
neoeasity, therefore, .freelJJ the sun will rise ~th ~imple 
neoeesity, therefore, without freedom. 
The second objection 1s that it I have fr~e wi 11 I 
oan obar.0e my purpose, and thus can truatrate the foreknowledge 
ot God. I should make 1 t fnlee, since wha.t God thour:ht I would 
do I will not do •. The solution 1e tb.at sin!le the .foreknowledge 
ot God is a Irn.o,Nledee of.· the present, ne lmows whether or not we 
will change our purpose, and, it we do change it, whe.t the new 
purpose will be. 
Another question arises. ·When we change o·t.'.r pu.rpose, 
4oee God• s kno"'\'lledt<se change w1 th 1 t, so that He has M. new knowl-
ecls• tor ray new purpose? The answer is "no." There 1s just one 
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i JmOWledge o.f the present in which botl: ptU'poses are contained, 
aince 1n <od' ~; knowledge our seco!'.!l purpo1:e does not follow the 
tirat. }3oth exist sinru.ltaneously, and hence there is no chllll[';e. 
pree will oari:'Ot cna:nca Ciodf S forelm.owledge of it. 
Accordi:r.l(;; to Lady Philosophy this last solution also 
answers that difficult!' which the disciple urged in his d.1 scourae 
against the adversary• s principle that th.ini"UI do not happen ot 
necessity because God foreknows them. but that God foreknows them 
ot neees:1ity because they will bappen. The reader wil1 recall 
the discinlete holdinc it to be unworthy of God to have free will 
aote as the cause of His foreknowled.P:e. Applying again tJle 
answer just c:tven, r.ady Philosophy woula avPr that such is not 
. unworthy of rod, f!i nee those acts r\o not cJ·.;pnge his foreknowledge 
an.'!. aro as JJrosont events to Him. Since th1a is ao, His tore-
knowled{:;e does not dopend on our acta. such reasoning would seem 
to make it clenr ti'at the L~dy d.oea not accept the word "cause" 
here 1n its ord.:1.nm-y mean1ne;1 i.e., ae implying dependence. con-
aequently, ?irffl'~ she defends the dictum, "our acta cause the fore-
knowledge of God• If she usee the word in a new aor..ae • 
Th:t:tR once more .does Lady Ph11oaophy defend. the ad-
versary• a prj.nc:tple. 'J.'hus e.lao doe8 she n1eet the lest difficulty 
atandln.g 1n the way of the reconciliation of tree will w1 th tlod' s 
foreknowled(!'e. Sho ends h~r speech by aff'1rm1ng that, since we 
truly have £re~ will, and. since He :t'orel<:nows all our free will 
acta, God car: j,~etly reward virtue anti pun.1ah ain. further, m.an 
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oaft truly hope in God and pray to Rim. She concludes by advising 
the dieciple to live a good life and to pray and hope. o1'ter1ng 
•• a motive the tact that he lives in the aight or h1a Judge, 
.po beholdtth all thinga.• so ends the dialogue l)etween La4J 
pbilosophJ an&i her diae1ple aa aet 4own in Book v of the 
~ conaolat1one Ph!l012J!h1&e. 
-
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!Totes to Chapter II 
1. catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. II, P• 610. 
-
2. In this che..:::,ter an attempt has been made to render faithfully 
the:~ line of arcu,.,~ent proposed 'try noetl".J.us in Book V 1 w1 thout 
reading into 1 t scholastic philosopl'.LJ' tor which there is no 
warrant in the text. At times the writer },aa expanded what 
seems evidently the thought of' Doethius more tully than it 
is presented in the text. 
In the disciple's speech, for the most part, the specific 
ofder and the form have been preserved; however in Lady 
Philosophy's discourse only tlw general order has been 
to1lowed. Often the form has been changed a little, but the 
sut·ata..nco of the matt<:::r has always been carefully retained. 
3. Whenever the word "certitude" !a mentioned in this theaia, 
absolute certitude is meant, never a high degree of prob• 
a.bili ty. 
4. The Lady's lons proof later on th~t things are not known ac-
cording to their naturea but aecordinr-; to the nature or the 
knowing faculty, ar.d her careful explanation of the simplieit, 
of God's knowledge are both mostly intended to meet this 
particular difficulty. 
s. 
6. This applLation in Boeth1us comes eir;ht linea further on, 
a new obj$ct1on having intervened. stewart & Rand, P• 
:572,52-54. 
7. The writers using this principle never Fteant that our free 
will acts ca,.ae the foreknowledge ot God in the true sense 
of th' word cause. To them the free will act was the essen-
tial condition or God's foreknowledge. A condition does not 
1 1ply dependence. whereas a cause does. nere as in other 
places, Boethius uses terms loosely. the exact terminology 
or scholastic philosophy did not yet exist. 
s. Now comes the application (cr. }iote 60), and imnediately 
follows the section on the impossibility or an uncertain 
event becoming the object of certain knowledge. 
9. Lady Philosophy says t...~t the disciple' a ~.fficulty in recon• 
ciling free will with the foreknowledge of God waa vehemently 
pursued by Cicero in his Distribution ot Divination. 
stewart & Rand, P• 382, 1-4. 
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Neither of the enawers seem at all to meet the difficulty. 
nowever, the Lady'a explanation of conditional and simple 
necessity, which comes later, does meet it quite well. 
Anoter point to be noted is the fact that even though she 
does not rive a satisfactory anewer, the reasoning is valid 
because the necessity distinction, somewhat adapted, could 
be introduced here. 
11. This explanation is m:,re lmgth1ly developed in Boeth1ua. 
12• Stewart & Ran~, P• 400, 9•10. 
1~· stewart & Rand, P• 402, 65, 0 Quaai jam gerantur.• 
1t. The Lady puts these ideas in a different fo~, but .ub-
stantially her reaaonine 1a the same as the explanation ~lven 
15. noethius• explanAtion 1n this whole matter see""'a quite . 
accurate, save that he makes Godta foreknowledge the condi• 
tion of the necessity. The type of necessity he haa ex-
plained would appear.present·even if God d~d not foreknow 
the act. In a word, God's foreknowledge does not sean 
responsible for the necessity in any way, even b7 wa7 of 
condition. · 
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CHAPTER III 
The Lamentation of ~roilua 
In C~pter II was given 11 summary and an elue1dat1on 
of Book v ot ·the De conaolat1one PbiloBOJ!biae, the aolut1on 
offered b7 noethiua to the problem or the recone1.llat1on of 
huMD tree will and divine foreknowledge. We are now read7 to 
take up the principal pa•aagea in the vi tinsa ot Chaucer where• 
in the poet treat• th18 aae-old. problem, and to &Qlatn what b.• 
haa wr1 tten 1n the light or the teachiq ot DoethS.u, we lhall 
t1~at consider what we have entitled •~he Lamentation ot 
Tro11ua, • an ucel'pt tPolll Book lV ot 7roilua an4 CP1aez4e, linea • 
til to 1078. 
Mr• B•L• 3etter-aon, in h1a Chaucer a1'ld the Consolation 
ot PhlloaoE!!l ot Boetbtua, remarks that th1a loq puaage .... 
taken over bod117 b7 Oha1loeJ- fi'Oil Boeth1ua, that it 11 rlrtual17 
a poetical traulatlon. In order· to ehow how cloae the tre.a• 
' lation 11, Mr. Jetteraon oomparea it with Ohauoer•• own prose 
tranalatioa ot ~· aama section 1ft Boeth1ua, po1nttng out a 
oloae s1m1lari tt in phl"aelng, · and an al:rnoa t 1ndent1ca1 arrange-
ment ot 1deu. According to Jfr. Jetteraon- Skeat• a obaenation 
(Oxford Ohauoer IIa490), •that a oona1derable portion of tbia 
pasaace 1a oepted, more or lea a c loael7 trom Boeth1ua,• ia UDder• 
atatecl and. dal•a41ng, Indeed the entire paaaage, w1 tb tll.e ez• 
cept1on ot -. 11••• 1a copied. d1rect1J from BMthiu., Mr. 
,., ... 
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;etters or: roes on to say the. t the few changes :made by Chaucer 
••~"• slir:ht, that they do not effect the subject matter, ,and. that 
tb•f were necessary to meet the requirements of rhythm and meter. 
we •hall have more to say later about these contentions of Mr. 
Jefferson. J:-'or the present it will suffice to remark that they 
ue accurate, except that they ignore one important omission made 
b7 chaucer. 
In the following commentary on "The Lamentation ot 
Troilus" we shRll refer to successive groups of linea as 
•sections." 11'his procedure, we hope, will make our comnu~ntary 
more intellig!l:il.e, and provide tor greater facility in cross-
reterence.1 
Section l 
Goth Pandarus, and Troilus he soughte, 
Til in a temple he f:)nd hym. al allone, 
As be that of his lit no lenger roughte; 
du t to the pi touae godde• ever1chone 
950 Ful te.-.ly he pre;r•d., and made his mone 1 
To doon hym aone out of this world to pace; 
For wel he though.te ther was non other grace. 
And shortly, al the sothe for to seye, 
He wae so fallen in despeir that day, 
955 That outraly he shop ~ tor to deye. 
For right thus ..... his argument alway: 
He seyde, he nas but lorn, so weylawayt 
"Per al that comth, comth by necessitee: 
Thus to ben lorn, it i .. a.. my ae•~•. " 
Pandarua finds Troilua in a temple, alone and in 
ooaplete deapair. ue is praying to the rods to make him soon 
Paae out of thie world. So fallen is he into despair, that he 
1a utterly resolved to die, for this is ever hie argument: He is 
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101 t because all that comes, comes by necessity 1 and 1 t 1s his 
411 tin7 to be lost. Troilus has here stated hi a position. All 
tbe actions of a man's lite are ordered beforehand lnt~ a certain 
iron-bound plan. ~~en his life-time comes, he must of necessity 
act according to this plan. A.;cording to his own life plan he 
must now be lost. There is nothing to do about it, and so logi-
cally he despairs, praying to the gods for release from lite. 
Section a 
960 "For certeynly1 this wot I wel," he seyde6 
"That forsight ot divine purveyaunce 
Hath aeyn alwer me to torgon criaeyde, 
Syn God seeih every thyng, out or doutaunee, 
lnd hem diaponyth, tho:rugh his ordina.unoe, 
965 In hire meritea sothly tor to be, 
As they shul com.en by predestyne." 
He knows well that Jod has foreseen that he will loae 
criseyde. ("Being loat" to Tro1lua means, of course, his ~ 
pending separation from Crise7de.) God foresees all .future 
events and ordains and disposes them. 
section :s 
"nut natheles, allas! whom shal I leeve? 
f'or ther ben grete clerkea many oon, 
'hat destyne thorugh ar,nlmentea prove; 
970 And som. men 887ll that. nedely, ther is noon, 
But that tre ohois is yeven us everyehon. 
o, welaway! ao sle1gb.e am clerkea olde, 
1hat I not ~hoA opynyoun I may holde • 
. we now find out something mo:re about the extent to 
Which Tro1lua believes the arguments he has been g1 ving. He 
•ars that many great clerks have proved predestination;& but, on 
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.. o1;ber h,and, scm men deny predestination entirely. Both sides 
~ argued 80 well that he does not t.;now which aide has the 
n:_:,ut natheles, allas ~ whom shal I leeve?" 
Section 4 
"For som men aeyn, it God seth al biforn, 
Ne God may nat deceyved ben, parde, 
975 Than moot it fallen, theiEh men hadde it sworn, 
That onttveiance hath aeyn bet ore to be. 
vlherfore I aey, that from eterne 1t he 
Hath wist byforn oure thought ek aa oure dede, 
We han no fre choia, as thise clerkea rede. 
He tells what •som men aeyn" i.e., tells how they 
d•tend predestination. Before (of. Section 3) he stated that 
there were mar~ "grete clerkea" who proved predestination with 
arguments. Now he is going to give one of the ~guments uaed by 
some. •hether or not tt.LOae using this argument are of the number 
ot "grete clerkea" he does not say. If, firat, God foreaees all 
things, and, secondly., may not be deceived, i.e., may not have 
false knowledge, then a tuture event which God roreaeea must 
happen of necessity, even though men had sworn it would not. With 
th1a brief statement of' the argument, 'l'roilua also gives hie 
; attitude toward 1 t. It the two principles put forward by- these 
men be true ('i'roilua states but one, but trom the context, it 
can be seen that the other is implied), then, as these clerks 
declare, there is no tree will. To him. it appears that this 
argument provea predeat1nation1 altl::oueh he has already admitted 
that the opponents of predestination can put up so strong a de-
tenae that he is utterl7 unable to decide whether the7 or the 
de.fenders o.f predestination have the stronger arguments. It is. 
di.t'.ficult to analyze his state of mind. He expresses evident 
dOubt, and yet seems inclined more to predestination, since he 
1, actinc on tl.ds h:y-potheaia. Until practically the end of his 
aoliloqu:y he ar{:,<>tles to prove predea tina. tion. 
In tt.is section begins the virtual translation of 
soethi u.s. 3 'fhe addition of the phrases n for a om men aeyn," 
theigl~ ~ en hadde it sworn.," and "as thise clerkes rode, 8 
do not change the thou.r)'"'t o!.' tt.1.e author o the De Consolatior:e. 
Up to this section Troilus is mo:r•e or less 1ntroducinc his sub-
ject. Lis 1ntro:::·u.ction to the subject d'!.ffera greatl:r from that 
which we have seen in Boethius.4 
981 
985 
"" 
- Section 5 
"For other thought, nor other dede also, 
Vyghte nevere ben, but swich ~s purveyaunce, 
~1dch may nat ben deceyved nevere mo, 
IIath feled byforn, w1 thouten 1gnora.unce. 
i'"or yf thor m.yghte ben a varis.unce 
To wri then out frCJ Geddis pur':.reyinr.;e, 
Ther nere no prescience ot thyng compynge. 
"But it were rather an opynyoun 
Uncorteyn.1 and. no stedfast .for,leyr,;ge." 
Men cannot have a thought or dec~d which God does not 
.foreknow, because l1od knows all things and eannot be deee.ived. 
These words merely restate the two pr1nc1pl~s given ln the 
previous section, an:i apply them to men's thouchts :'U'ld deeds. 
Wow Tro1lus e:oes a step further. If' t'len could escape this fore-
knowle~-:e by any means, the only kind of kn:ywledge left for God 
their future actions would be uncertain opinion .• to h&Ve 
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In all this reasoning Chaucer 1~ riving a virtual 
,.anslation of Boethius- At this point, however, he makee an 
!!F'.pol"tant om:1sa:t on. I.et us recall how Boethi us r...a.."ldloo the 
argument here. Just as Tro1lus does, the disciple asserts that 
there can be no free will acts, because tf t11ere were, God could. 
not have certain foreknowledge of them, but onlr uncertain 
opinior.. The disciple gives no immediate proof for this asser-
tion, but p".lts lt off until much later 1!1 h1s discourse. For the 
present l:.e merely makes the statf'F-cent and builds his ·ext step 
upon it as if 1.7" were true. It wlll be remembered that the post• 
poned pr.oof consiated in this t.hnt God would have foreknowledge 
of a !'reo will act, a. thing whlch of 1 tn nature is :.1ncertain and 
. this would be ra·' se knot~~;ledge. An was explained in Chapter !I, 
this arvunent was ~~hf'7 fc·:mdation of the disciple' a v<hole position. 
Lady Philosophy spends a long tirre retutinr, wl:at she thinks is 
the err•:)r at the root of it, n .. ~'"nely, the belief that tr:in~":S A.re 
known according to their nati.lres., when in real:l ty the~r are known 
1 
aecordint; to the nature of the faculty k:lowing them. I''u:rthar, 
she sprm~ much time explrdning how God's intellect has h~ ~ower 
of knowing uncertain :f'tttnre eve::::;ts with eerti tude, this beeaus" 
He knows the future as 1."' it were present. Thus we see that this 
proof 1~ of considerable i~9ortanee 1n the speech of the disciple. 
'l'he d:t flc1ple lntl.Woduees ~. t towards the end of hie di seo'!.ll"Se. 5 
Just as Tr~ilua, he, in the beginning, merely :w .. 'l~{es a stateMent~ 
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and then builds on this s ta ter,~ent as if 1 t were true. But 
'l'ro1lua does not bring in the proof later on as does the dis-
ciple. So Troilust speech, despite Mr. Jefferson's assertions, 
is not quite a virtual translation of noethlue. 
section 6 
990 And oertes, that we~e an abusion, 
That God sholde han no parfit cler wytynge 
More than we men that han doutous wenynge. 
But swich an errour upon God to gease 
''':ere f'als and foul, and 'til kked coraedneaae. 
Tro1lus in. this section advances to the next step ot 
his argument. It "were an abusion" if voo had no more clear and 
perfect knowledge than we have about future free will acta, 'i.e. 
it He had nothing more tr..an doubtf'ul conjectures concerning them. 
To deny God's havin[" perfect knowledge wo<:ld be untrue, vile, a 
w1 eked abomination. Chaucer is quite close to his original in 
this section. 
section 'f 
995 rt1::k this is an opynyoun of· some 
That hal hire top ful heighe and sm.othe yshore: 
':i.'hey seyn right thus, that thyr.g is nat to come 
Por that the preso!enee hath seyn by:fore 
Tr;at it shall come# thereof:re tl1e p...u•veyaunce 
~oot it by:forn1 withouten ignoraunce; 
"And 1n this manere this neeess1te 
Retorneth in his pal~t contrarie agayn. 
For ned:fully byhoveth it nat to bee 
1005 That thilke thynges fallen in c~rtayn 
That ben purveyed; but nedly, aa they sayn, 
Byhoveth it tl .. at t.hyngea whiche that falle, 
That they 1n certayn ben purveyed alle. 
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In this section Troilus is "·oin~: to r.~ive very briefly 
11 
principle w:t th which the defenders of the other side attempt to 
:reeono·tle free 'Wi 11 w~- th the foreknowledce of God. According to 
thiS principle r-m event does not come to p~ss because God knows 
bu. t beca~lse 1 t "~Jd 11 
therefore God ~own it beforeh~rd. They assume that according to 
the position of those det'ending predestination an act of the will 
which God forelmows must co::r.e to pass because He foreh."'nOWS 1 t. 
aod'e very foreknowledge of the act createP the necessity of that 
aet' 6 eomine; to pass. !n a word, the foreknowledge causes the 
neeesnl ty of th:ir:.~·s happenlnp:. 1l'hey on th~ir side a.rf:"Ue that the 
a.ct doee not at all co!'1e to pe.aE~ because God foreknows it {there-
fore that the foreknowled;:e does not cause the necessity of 
thinr:a happeninr:), b'ut on the contrary·, r-oe foreknows 1 t because 
it will como to pas~. ne have now complet£:d the matter of lines 
995-l()Ol. Let us examine then lines 1002-1008: "And 1n this 
manere thla neceasite retor:neth in hi~ part .contrarie agayn, etc." 
:rn the fut"J.re I shall perform some free will action. 
Since (Jod knows all thinr"s, He nr...lst foreknow this action; her1.ee 
the action, so to speak, cau~es the necessity of God•s foreknow• 
ing 1 t, . e:1d on this account the adversaries ca.n Bay that the 
necessity passes over to the other side. It is not necessary 
that those thinp;s happen whlch are foreseen, but it is necessary 
that those thinr,s be foreseen which wt 11 hs.';)pen. 
In this whole section Chaucer, ~o far a.a the line 
or argument is concerned ia quite close to his original. 
Naturally 011oug; 1 we u .. ) not look 1n .' .. oethius fo1· ru; equivalont 
ot chaucer' a nsome t'hat han hire top ful he1ghe end am.othe 
yabore. • such a phrase is typioall:r Chaucf~rian. 
1010 
1015 
1020 
section G 
"! meno as thoug: I laboured me in this, 
:r'o enquer'en wtd.ch thJng oauae or which th1Jlg be: 
\S wlle1ther that tha prescience of Ood !s 
The certeyn cause ot the nocessite 
Ot thyngea that to comen ben, psrde; 
Or 11' nacesa.:. te or thyng oompJ%160 
Be cause certeyn of the purveyinge. 
"But now n' enforce I t".e nat in sho"7nge 
How tot:..o ord.l'•e tJf enuaes a tar~ t; but wol 7i.()Ot l 
That 1 t hyboveth that the bytallynge 
0£ thJ-7.\{.CS Wl f! te by!'::-;ron certe;:,"l'llJ 
Be neceauar1o• al aeme 1 t nat therby 
':hat preac.L.mce put faLI..y-;i.ge nec~Hl;Ja:!.l'"'O 
To thyng to come, nl ralle 1t faule or taire. 
For tL.e aoJ:o ol.' clarity, lot us con;:~,ider how 
Boethi us (\~,om. Chaucer 1:.;. !'o llow:!.n; qui c closely !n this a eo-
t1on} puts the r'lf.d ter. Accord!ng to tho disciple, his adversary 
1s miasir~: the ;.;>cint at iasuth iho Q.14CB t: on the advt::raary l.s 
trying to $-}ttle 1s -r.·hetian" .the .toreknowledce of Jo~ oauae.s tl-.:e 
neceaai t:; of the future act, or wil.cthor- the f·!.i.ture event, by the 
tact that it will ~ouac d.a;r ex! at, cat.uu~a t;·.o ,n';}cesz1 t¥ of Cod's 
tcreknor1inf 1 t. t,;ha t t:,e diac1_ple hl..msolf is tt•yin;;; to prove is 
that whichever of the two .;;,ossl""lc· ar~swcre ia .:..,lvcn, the !'Act 
l'erca.ine that c. th::nc fcrekc.own t:r God CU.Bt hb.i,'l,pon of necessity .. 
Even £l'tl.nt1n£, tho CGr;ttmtlOn Of the ttdVEI!'Sar'f that for&knoW'lEld.t,e 
dooa not cause the ncccws: ty of the or.;:curence of .future e.vrmte, 
39 
nevertheless,. foreknown things must necessarily come to pass. 
The disciple then coes on to prove from the example of the man 
sitting that a thlnt: foreknown l!!!lSt happen of necessity, admitting 
for the sake of arcument that the foreknowledge does not cau.ae 
that necessity. 
1025 
1030 
1035 
section 9 
"For if ther aitte a man yond on a aee, 
Than by neeees1te blhove~ it 
That, cetttea, tb.7tl op,-nyoun sooth be, 
That wenest or oonjeetest that he a!t. 
And further over now &J&rnward yit, . 
Lo, right so is it of the part contra1rie 1 
As thus, - nowe herkne.- tor I wol nat tarie: 
• aey 1 that 11' the op:vnyoun of the Be soth1 for ttPt he sitte, thrn sey! this, That he mot siten by neoeasite; 
~.nd thus necessi te in eyther ir'. 
For in hym uede of e1 tt,.nge 1a, 7"781 
And in the nede of seth; and tLus, forsothe 
there mot naceaa.ite ben in yow bothe. 
Troilus eives an example of .one• a knowing a fact 
which 1a present be.f·:'tre him; this exa..,Tllple he o:!'fers as a parallel 
to God's foreknowledge of the fUture. A mnn is sitting there 
before you. It is necesaal"Y that your j't:d{~emont "the r:Jan efts" be 
true. (Neither Tro11us nor the disciple tell us the reason for 
thls neeess1 ty; probably 1 t would be the following: 1 t is ;.;~r­
teotly evident that the r:an s1 ts1 and in the race of such stttong 
evidence one must of necessity have true ktowledge.) Further, 
JOu oan reverse the process. If y::ur judger:1ent or t.'le sl tting be 
true, then the man or necessity nru.st sit. There must of 
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neceae1t:r exist a tact to w~::lch 7:ur juagement con.ror:u. f.t'hua 
' there is neceasi ty on e1 tlun• aide, or your judgement' 1 being 
true, and. of the man e1ttint• Chaucer adhnx-ee closel:· to Boethiue 
1n th1a aeetion. 
1040 
aeot1on 10 
"But thoW IDAJ'&t ••Jl'l, the nu1 a1 t nat t'ber•tore, 
That ta:1yopynyotm or 'b1a fd tt~e soth 1aJ 
nut rather, tor the IIIah a1 t t:1er lqt'ore, 
therfo:re 1s thJn ~ soth1 JW!•• 
A.rMJ. I .. ,.., t.hougn the oauae ot aoth at' this 
comth o:t h1a 81 tt'J'ng, r•t necea~1te 
11 on troonaunged bo t.h in ltyJi!t ~ the. 
nut 7ou. J?lft.Y aay ~ cau.ae of the a1 tt1nc 1e not the 
truth or y0ur J~semontJ but on the contra.t'7, the t:rutb ot 70\tt" 
judgement !a eauaoo by the ~ti tting. ~'be al'l8Wer 111 that, althO\lgb 
the oaua• o£ the neoet1&1 ty c~• onl7 from one a:tde, hom the 
man 11 tt1ng, there 18 a oommol'J. neoeaai ty on both aides. In the 
previous aectlon Tro11ue npldned ..tutt he Mant by that co=non 
neceaa1ty. '!'hare 1• tho neoetsity ttutt yo~Jl' opinion be true, Al'!4 
the ntteetut.i ty ot t.he man sl tt1na· 
the comrr:r..)Jl MCG8S1 ty, the worcsa Boetb!tUJ uaea to expretta 1 t ... 
"COlllmm1s 1n utraque necea1 taa." 7 ChaU.081' l'et'ld.eH theae wnl'tla 
•yet neceaa1 te ia en treohaunged both 1n b,1a and the ( l1MI 1048-
1043) •" About ttt1a c<mm10!\ nece•n1 ty l1r.Jettereon eayet 
aoethiua i.s torce4 to palt ti'lollt A doea not a1t 
down because fl' • opinion wu trtte, but that the 
opinion was W'-» beoauae A aat down. Yet he :re. 
•••et• lamely, tba t then wu a oomtttem nec•s•i t7 1n 
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.,won caused the e1 tt1ng. What he 1s atternpt1ng to prove 
trom his example ia that an existing tact which 1a known Jm18t be 
. •oeaaa1·:':r, even though the knowledge did not cause 1 ta _exiatence. 
s• it recalled that Lad7 Phlloaophy stated upllc1t.lr that the 
41eoiple uped •• ft-Om a algn to the neoeaai ty ot the mm 
aitt1ng. He believed that the a1gn 1nd1oatthi the neceee1t7J he 
40•• no4; aay that 1 t cauaed the neoeaa1 t7• 
For a better understanding of the whole aol11~ ot 
!rOil~, let it be aaid that 1t contains three tallac1eaa rlrat, 
ln the ca.ae or the man a1 tting, Tro1lua 4oea not 41at1nguia don• 
41t1onal neceaaity trom simple neceal1tyJ aeoondl7, he b.ellevea 
that uncertain th1nga cannot be known witr: certitudeJ th1JNU71 he 
W.nka that th1nga are lmown 1n aces ordance w1 th their natures, 
when as a matter ot tact the7 are lmown according to the nature fl 
blmonns taoulQ". 
Section 11 
•Tbua 1n tbia same wise, out of doutaunce, 
1045 I may wel maken, ae 1 t aemath ae, 
11 •••onJ118 ot Oo4dea pmtVe,..unce 
And ot the tbfn&•• that to comen be; 
a,. which reaoun men ...,. wel yee 
That th1lke thJqea that 1D ert'be talle, 
'1'ha t b7 ne ceea1 te they coaen all.e. 
Bow Troilus appl1ea hie e~le to the toretnowle4ge 
ot God. In the aame 1f&7 that he p-gue4 collOernil:t.g cme' .s knoWl• 
Ide• ot a am ai tt1ns. be reaaor..a r6lat1ve to God• • t()relmowl• 
•4&• and the things to come, holding conaequentl7 that ev.r7• 
_.... on earth happens b7 neoeaa1tJ. 
Section 11 
•:ror althou~ that, tor thyng aha1 come, 7"1•• 
'lhertore 1a it purvQ'ed., oerteJl'l17, 
wat. that 1t eomth tor 1t purveyed 1a; 
Yet .nathel••• b1hoveth 1 t nodtully, 
1055 That th1ng to come be purveyed, tr .. elyJ 
OJt ellee, tlq'Daea that purve784 be, 
That the7 b1t1den by neoeaa1te. 
•ADd thla autt1aeth rlght JDOugh, certe7n, 
For to deatroye oure tre chota eve17 del. 
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Alt~ Ohauoer 1a -.kiDS a Y1rtua1 tra.nalatlon 1n 
tb.la aection, h1a •tter la a0111what oontua1nth 'l'h1a la the fault 
ot :aoethiue, who b1raee1t 1• none too cleu-.10 At th1a •tas• of 
the dlacuaa1on~ tb.e 41ac1ple1 an4 Tro1lua alao, haa t1n1ahe4 wit;h 
hia example ad haa made b1a appUoatton. low be givea aoaething 
ot a ·~ of all that he ba• aa14 ld.noe he proposed the prin• 
. ciple of the a4YeH&J7• 1&18 the d1ac1plet •It 1a neceaaat'7 
e1 ther that the tuture eventa be toreaeen b7 God, or that thlnga 
toreaeen happen.• !ro11ua puta hla idea ln the worda ot the 
preaent aeotlona "Yet natheles, b1hovetb it nedtu11J, that thine 
to ooae be purcveyed, trewell'J or ellea, tb:Jngea that purvqed be, 
'hat they b1t1den by neoeasite.• Aa the reader reoalla, this 1a 
~. question which Boetin1ua held that the adveraariea were trJina 
' 
M aolve ._. tbe,- put forward their principle. From hia r•aaon• 
taa he haa aa..S.ngl7 proved that whichever way you solve th1a 
••tton, the taot rema1na that th1nga torelmotm. muat happen ot 
U.eaa1 t'1• .t.a 'l'roilua pute itt "And th1a auttiaeth )1lough1 
43 
e.rteyn, for to deatru7e oure tre oho1a everr del.• 
In the worda which begin th1a aeot1on, •por although 
~bat, tor th7ng ahal eoae1 JW7a, therefore 1a it purve7ed, 
oert_,nly, nat that lt.coath tor 1t purveyed ia," Tro1lua, like 
the diac1ple, .ia merelJ' ree.alling the tact tb.&t 1n nie reasoning 
rro• the example he has granted tor the sake ot argument that the 
e"fent does not happen ot necessity beoauee God foreaeea lt• 
1080 
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Sect1c-n 11 
•But now 11 thie abue1oUll, to ••JD. 
That tallJflg ot thJD«ea teaaporel 
Ia oauae ot Ooddee pr.1cle»ae eternel. 
B01r trftel.7, that 1a a tala aentence, 
'l'llat thJD8 to oo• lbo14e oauae h1e J»reaoienoe. 
ttwbat JQ'Pt I ...... and I baAU n1oh a tllouaht, 
But that God JN"'878th thJD8 that 1• ·to eoae 
For that 1t 11 to com., lft4 ellle aou&btt 
So .,thte I ••• that tlv'DI•• alle a!Jd some, 
'l'laat 11b.11• be 'b7ta1le u4 OTerco•1 
Ben oauae ot thJ.lke aovere,.ae. p urveyaunee, 
That torwoot al w1 tb.outen lpD!taunoe. 
'!'hue tar 'l'ro1lua hu been 4etetld1ng h1a poet t1oa 
qalnat the pr1no1ple ,of the a4Yeraar1eaJ .now be takes the 
ottenae againat 1 t. It 1a abaurd, he aqa, to say that the 
bappeDS.ng ot teJ19oral th1nga 1s the oauae ot God• a etemal lmowl• 
tdce. The a4ver•e1ea, w1 th the~r prinolple that God foreknows 
th1naa because the7 will come to paaa, equlvalent17 • .,. that 
hture eventa cause 111• toreJmowled.ge, and further that all the 
thtnga wh1oh haYe happene4 1n the put have uarc1H4 thia 
.. '"'ality. 
1075 
SMt1on 14 
•And over al tbia, 7et aey I .ore harto, 
That right aa whan I wo t ther 1a a thJng, 
I,.a, that 1d1J'n& JIOot ned.tul7 be aoJ 
Ek right ao, wban I woot a th)"n8 OOitJng, 
so mot 1t OOIIItJ and thua the b1tallYJ1!! 
Ot thyngea that ben w:tat b1tore the tide, 
!'hq ••• nat bon eaohued on no qde. 
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Furthel'tmore, aqa Trollua, •••n aa when I know there 
lJ a thing, that thiq aat exiat ot neoeaa1 Q-1 m alao when I 
pow a thing 1a coming, that thlllS IIU.at come of neoeaa1t7• An4 
t;hUa the comins about ot ~ns• torelm.owrl oannot be prevented 1n 
anTW1••• rn tb1a ••otlon he la harJd.n'l: baok to t~ a1tt1ng ex• 
aple and appl7ing 1t to toNknowledge ot the 1uture, which ap• 
pl1oat1on he haa alrea.dJ ll&d.e, thouQ'l 1mpl1c1tl.7• (ct. linea 1064· 
1o.i'7.) 'l'h1e epp11oat1on aeema 11g1oall7 out ot place here, be• 
oauae the aeotlon 1.._41atel7 prev1oua begtna a new line ot 
thoU&ht• However, 1 t la to be noted that 1n thta aeotion, 1here 
Chauoer tollwa hia or1g1nal 1n all reapecta, the appl1oat1on 1a 
clearer 8l'ld more expUc1t than 1n the ft.trrr.er one. 
Thua doea T:ro1lua en4 bla argument b7 which he tr1ea 
to demonstrate that tree Will oannot be Noone! led w1 th Oodt e 
toreknowleqe. Aa we will :reoa.ll, tbe d1so1ple doea not leave ott 
at tliia point. The latter aext g1vea ua that important proot tfllf 
hla aaae:rt1on that GOd cannot have toNJmowleqe ot tree wilf aota1 
~ lhlt only unoerUJ.n expeotatlOAe. !he proof waa that htee wt.U 
• .. , • .,which are ot their Y81'J' nature unoertain~oannot be toralcnown 
111\h cert1tu4e.ll Tl'o11u olld.ta thia proof ent1rel7 troa h1a 
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1peeoh, which otherwise la a fairly close translation ot 
aoeW.ua. After tJd.a proof', aa waa pointed out in Chapter II, 
the d1ae1ple considers his poai tion well enough defended., and 
. . 
GonelUd.ea b7 anumerat1ag the woe.tul thine,a that must be true ot 
•n if' b.e has· no· f'ree w111.12 
Section 15 
Tha.nne aeycle he tbua, "Al.Jqghty Jove 1n trone, 
'l'hat wooat ot al this th7n8 the aotbtaatneaee, 
aewe on 7113 aOl'We, and do me de7en aone, · 
Or brrng Criaqde and me trom tb1a d .. treaael" 
And whil he was in al this hev,nesse, 
D1aputrn! with b:Juelt 1n this matere, 
Com Pandare in, and aeJ4e aa 7e Jna"f hex-e. 
tt.o1lua ooncludea w1 tb. a prayer to Jove. •;oye, he 
t&J'a, •7ou who lmn the truth or this •tter, pltJ' .,. sorrow aDd 
11 t • die eoon, or else briDg Or1a.,-de and • out or tbia dis• 
treaa. Chaucer then adds that, llbile Troilua waa in the midst ot 
Wl11 sadness and aelt-41aput1ng1 he ws.a interrupted b7 Pandar\la. 
It would be well now to .,. up the att1 tude ot mine! 
which 1'ro1lua manite1ta in hla aolll0flt17 regarding the 
foreknowledg .. t.ree will prObl... rn 11ne1 944•96?, aeotiona l 
aDd s, Chaucer tells us that '.l't-oilU. 1a all alone in the temple, 
oar1ns no louger tor Ute. and pt-aying to each ot the gods to let 
h1a eoon paaa out or this world. H• tb1nka there 1a no other 
favor tor b1m but .death. lf• hae ao oompletel7 tallen into 
cleapalr that he 1e utterly reaolYed to 41e. Chau.cer 1sned1atel7 
aaa1gne the reuon tor th1a attitude (•tor right thus was h1a 
arsu-ent al.wa7a•). A:ll thlllge happen b7 neoeaa1 ty. It 1a 
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neceaaary that he be loat, i.e. be separated trom Or1aeJde. He 
mowa well that God has toreaeen that he Will lose her, and there 
11 no doubt but that God toreeeea and ordaina and d1spo~ea them 
aa they haYe deserved to be. 
So tar Tl'o1lua 1a quite eertain about ~. whole 
•tter. But now doubt ontera hie mind. He remarks ( aeot1ona 3 
and 4) that ancient cle:rke have ao cunningly al'gue<\ ·tor- and. 
asalnat predestination that he 1a not able to ~u4c· which aide 
baa ha4 the better of it. His attitUde ot mind. has changed from 
one ot certitude to one of doubt. 
In tb1 e a tate ot mind he prooeed.a to g1 ve a long line 
ot arsument which •••• to h1a to prove predeat1nat1on ( aeotl.one 
5 to 14). Be doea not give the argwanta on the other aide. Yet' 
preaUII&bl7 tlMJre are e'tPong ~~nta tor tbat a14e, atroq 
eno\llb to prevent Tro1lua troa boldina the neo"a1 tartan 
ph1loaoph7 w1 th oert1 tude. 
When he haa oonoluded. h1a reasoning, he otters a 
pra7er to Jove which 1a pertectlJ' 1n accord w1 th h1a 4oubtful 
a tate ot minch Jove knowa which aide is true. If it 1a true, 
therefore, that tree Will cannot be reconciled w1 th God' a tore-
knowledge, and that all happena of neoeasity. then he IIUat be 
aeparated trom cr1ae7de. May Jove let h1a die then aa aoon aa 
possible. If, on the other, hand, there can be tree will, and 
oonaequently the poss1b111tr of avoiding the separation, he praya 
that Jove might •b~g Cr1aeJde and me tro th1a deatreaae.• Thua 
hta tinal atate ot m1D4 ~ell81na one or complete doubt. 
'' :rrom thia soliloquy ot Trotlu, Wba• ._ we ~.... 0~ 
Ob&uoer• s on attitude towud the 'Oroblem of raooncS.Uq .,... 
rill W'1 th the d1 Yine torelm.o1rledgef we can leam but 11 ttle. It 
1a always Trollu who speaka, n...-.r Chaucer hlmaelt, and alnce 
'l'nllua 1a •u•••l:r a tiot1t1oua oba»&Gter, •• oannot attribute the 
•••U.Onta ezoreaaed bJ' 111m to the autboP. Moreover, we musts 
· N._beP that Tro11ua ._. auttered. bitt_. m1afortua.e at the tlae 
of Jlla ll:loo!Q' .•o1110QUJ'• ad tbat it ia in k•epS.ng with h1a 
prea•t d1apoe1ts.a to ba'Ye a rat2ber d.eapairl.Dg view ot the atate 
ot ltldlk1n.d. 
Pert1n~nt, per~a, to the queat1o.a or Ohauoer•a 
att1,114e toftl'4a the •••••1tanan phllo••thJ' put tC1'1rard b7 
Tro11u, is the JUnner 1a 'lhich he ooncluea h1a •U1lel tragedy•'•• 
Athz' Tro11u1 •• slain bJ Achillea, his treed ap1r1t ascend~ 
bliaah.llf ·f» the e1~ th sphere ot heaven. There, beholding the 
wa~r1ng atara and listening to the heavenl7 melody, !'ro1lu 
began utterl7 to 4eap1ae thia wretched warld, and to hold all 
mun4ane pleasures t.o be Yard ty in comparison to the tull tel1o1 t7 
ot heaYen. 
An4 down hom thennea tute he gan •YJ•• 
!hle l1tel spot of er~•• that with the ae 
Km'bl'aoet1 ia, and tully gan 4eap1ae 
!hi a Wl"eco.ned wo:rld• and held al van1 te 
To :reapeot of pleJD. tel1e1te 
That la 1n hevene above. (V ,180'1·1819) 
Chau.oer thereuopn po1nta a moral. He a4Y1aea 70\JDI 
tollc to forego th.S.I' • rldl7 'Yanity, and. to ca•t tbe1r qea upoa 
the God Who •de th • 1n Hie image • The7 ahould not aeek 
"feJUede loYea" after the manner of Tro1lue and Cr1.,Me; but 
rather center their wholt affection upon their creator·and 
Redeemer, "a'yn ha be•t to love 1e. • ~om the traGtedy of.' Troilua 
theae 7cnmg tolka may ... ot' wha\ little .. 110rtm were the "pa,-ena 
oorae4 olda ritaa," how little •va1led the worship or the gada, 
what little reward fC!' toil waa g1ven by Jove, APOllo, Mare, and 
•Wichraso,.".lle.• Such-reprobation ot the whole pap:an aystem 
undAt~t which the tiotltioua Tro11UII has hie being argues atronglJ" 
aga1nat thet view that ChaUcer 1a 1nd1oat1ng bia own op1n1on 1n 
the aollloquy ot '1'1'011ue wi.t.ich we nave been oona1der1ng. we shall 
have aore to aq later regard1~ Chaucer'• own attitude towartta 
the pr6blel'll or the reoono111at1on ot divine for-eknowledge and 
buJUa fltee wtu. 
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Chapter IV 
ohant1aleer and DeltlDJ" 
This ohapter w1 n have to do w1 th the aeoond paaaage 
in 11b.1ch Chauoer dwella t• aom.e lefllth on the problem of 
reooao111ng the free will ot aen with the foreknowledge of GOd. 
'l'h1a aecOJld paaa4'ge noura 1n the l'un' a Prieatt a 'l'r.le, linea 
3110-3150. · · Aga1 n Chaucer la 1n4ebte4 to the De oeaola tlone. 
Ot the thr•• cUfferent tnnera to the problem which be propoaea, 
as haYing been ott•ed b7 the olerloa, two are 4er1ve4 trea 
Book V. Aa we will remember, La47 Phlloaopl'q 1n her solutdon 
cl1at1Dg\l18he4 beween two k1J'l48 of neoeaa1t'f1 cond1t1onal and. 
a1aple. Moreover, the poa1t1on defended b7 the d1ao1ple baa 
beeD lb.own aa equift.lent to that ot o~ uphol<Ung a1mple 
nMeaa1 t7• In the paaaqe troa the lha1' a Pr1eatt s Tale, 4DD4l• 
t1ona1 neoeaa1tJ and a1a,le.naa•••ttr are given aa reprea•nt1ng 
two ot the tbl'ee arunrera to t.he probl•• 
fJ.'he whole ot tbe J\1.1\f • Prleat• a Tale 1a 1n a la'lw>reua, 
•ok•hero1o tone • The genlal ohap1a1n haa juat tinlahM. tellJ.ns 
b.cnr Ohant1oleer, who had ben. ...,..d bJ' h1a dreama not to go ou' 
late the JaN that •• 1a penua4ed 'b7 hS.a wite, Dame r-..tlet, 
•• 41aregar4 them. Cbant1oleer 1a now 1n the yarct w1 th b1a h•raa• 
an4 • fox 11•• hidden,. awaiting h1a ohance to apr1ng on hl•• 
'!'ben tollowa the ph11oaoph1eal reflection 11h1oh •• have to oon• 
alder. and the t1r•t part ot wb10h we have calledt 
section 1 
0 Chauntecleer# aou.raed be that morwe 
'!'hat thou into that 7erd :tlaUE#l tl'o the bemea1 
Thou were tul nl J'WarD&4 by th7 dremea 
'rhat thilke 487 was perilous to thee J 
But what that God f'OPwoot moor nectea bee. 
3255 After the opinion ol certa1n elerlda. 
W1tneeee on ~ tma• •7 pa:rfi t olerlr la, 
~hat 1n aool& ta greet alteroac1oun 
ln thts mateere, and greet d1aput1aoun, 
And haUl been or an hundred thousand men. 
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The mornlng on whieh Ohant1.oleer tlew :t:rom blfl 
ratwra 1n~o the yard 1a accuraed. He waa :f'ullJ' WAJWD8d. b7 hie 
d.r•- that the eta)' wu to be per~ to h1aJ uno• he ahoUld 
haYe remained at home aTY1 aot ,.,;t,tNtd ttorth. or hili own bee 
WS.l~ desp1 te evident 'I!Pam1:nga# he was walking into tbe tace or 
<ianS•r• But attM' all, was he Hall7 aot1ng w1 th tree w1llT waa 
he no'b rather t~oed by neceaa1t7 to act •• he did! God to~ 
that he would go 1nto the yarc.t that 4q, and •what God torwoot 
moot ne4ee bee, atter the oplftloun of om-te1 n o lerld.a.• 
But tlutae clerka do aot have evtti'Jthin£ their. oa 
•7• The question haa been hot1y debated. Arrt olerJc 11ho lmowa 
h1a bue1neaa oan bear w: tne8s to the taot that thC'e 18 now a 
pea' altercation and 41apute about th1• matter, and has been 1n 
tbeput. A hUbdl-84 thoUeand. haw 10\llbt over 1t. something Will 
..S.d. S.n the n&xt chapter concerning the h18tor1cal a•peot or th18 
41eput1ng. 
But I M lean nat bulle 1t to the bren• 
As kan the hoolJ doctour August,n, 
01- Boeoe, cr the Blaahop Bradward,Jn, 
Whe1 ther that Godaea worth)" torw! t'1J'1S ·. 
Str.,-neth • nedely tor to doon a tl4'J'C, ... 
"Nedel,. elepe I eJmPle neceaslteeJ 
Or elles, tt' tree ChOJ"• be graunte4 me 
ro do that same thyng, or do 1 t nogh t, 
'l!hout~ God farwoot it er that it w&A· wroght, 
Or U his wit:'J'ing a~th nevet- a d&el· 
aut by naoeseltee cond1oloneel. 
The Nun' a Pr1eat ·"kan nat b',.lte 1t. to th• uren, • i.e,.' 
he oannot a1f't it to the chatt • Be cannot decide which of the 
three anawera !a the correct one,· aa ean the holJ d.octOI' 
AugQt1ne1 or Boethiua, or B16o:P Bradwardine. The t1rat v1n, 
o• wh1oh he baa alread7 propoaed, 1a now put thuaa "Wei thel' tlaat 
Godde• worthy tol'W1tyng atreyneth me nedely tor to doon a tb1ng," 
J 
i.e., whether Gad•a tareknow~e compels me neoeasa:ril'1 to do 
something• !te explains 1n a parentheaia exactl-7 what he maal'la bJ' 
"nedelJ'.• •Nedel.T' olepe I qmple necess:t tee. The second 
an..,. 1a that tree oho1oe 1s granted mm to do a tlllng or not to 
do 1 ,, even though God lmowa beforehand what ohoioe w1U be ~·· 
In a word• there is no repuananee 1n free 'Will nnd Ooclt • fore-
knowledge. The th1rd an&lt'U' 1a that God • a forelmowleclge SJrc>o••• 
•concli t1onal neceaai tJ'·.~ 
About thoae three m awen Mr. Je.f:feraon re~t 
It 1D8.J' be b7 aec14en,,· 'bllt the three 41ft8J'ent v1ewa 
preaented in th1a paasage are 1n accordance with the 
dltf'erent poa1 t1ou held b)" tba t".llNe pb1los~a 
men t1oned. B1ahop Brad-..rd1ne ardently uphelC! tore• 
orcU.natlon ard waa opposed even b1tter17 to tne will. 
He thought 1 t pre8W!tptuous for man to uaume tor h1Jitlit 
aelt the reapoM1b1l1t7 or freedom ot aot1on. II• 
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deemed all-aut.f1c1ent for man the divine grace. The 
b1ahop Bra4war41ne, therefore, aignt be auppo1ed to 
advocate 11 11mple meoeas1t71 " although he doe1 not 
uae th1a. term bS.JueltJ the lfun' a Prie1\ parenthet• 
ioall7 aasume1 that reaponsibility •••• at. Augult1ne 
occupied the pol1t1on presented in the aeco~ view. 
He bel1eve4 that tree will waa a gift from God to 
man 0!117 in ao £u u God permi ttedJ hence the fol• 
·lowtQg ~e& "Or ellea if free ehoys be 5raunted me. 
Boethiua ..... entertained aa hla belief the doctrine 
ot "conditional net•••it,r," mentioned here a1 the 
third posa1b111t,r. 
Aa Kr• Jettereon indicates in the wo~ "It mar be 
bJ accident,• Chaucer doea not aa7 that the three anawera belong 
re1peot1-vel7 to the three 41¢ tariea he men tiona. Be aerel7 
st•e• the name1 ot thoae 11bo can "bulte it to the bren,• am then 
pNaenta three solutions to the problem. 
ur. Jetteraon attributea the firat anawer, that ot 
aSaple neceas1 ty to Biab.op Bra41rardine. In the following ohapte• 
we ahall bave someth1ng more to sq about the position of th1a 
prelate. For the present 1t will suffice to remark that, though 
hie ph1loaoph1o ideaa are aeer!:ingly quite determ1niat1o, he 
neverthelela maintained that man has tree will. He coul4 aouoe• 
17 have r-ined a B111hop ot the catholic Church, it he did not 
-1nta1n the tree will of man. 
The 1eoond auwer, aooord1ns to Ill'• Jefferson, should 
be ••wibuted to st. Auguat1ne. comment11'lg on h11 own ob1ervatlon 
1a a toot-note, he 18711 
st. Auguatine considered the aubjeot ot tree will 
in the Oi 'f of God, Book v 1 Chap. VIII•XII. He ia 
particUlar 7 conoel'ned in disproving the view of 
cicero, who in \he I?! J)1 'f'lnatione haa argued that 
it 1a impossible to~both lhe foreordination of God 
and the fztee will of man to exiat and that, since 
a ohoio& between the two is necessiU'j 1 he prefers to 
beU.Ye in the l.atter.a 
If OM conaulta the place mentioned b7 Mr. Jetteraon, he does not 
t1n4 lt d1ft1oult to ••• the a11111ar1t,y pointed out bJ' h1m. st. 
Auguat1ne• a Y1ewa will be more tul-17 treated in the next chapter. 
The r..arka ot the Bun•a Pr1eat concerning a1aple and 
ooad1 tional neoeaa1 tr un401.1bted1:J come tl'om Book V ot the Jl! 
couolat1one. The reader Will recall that Lad7 Ph1loaoph7 ln her 
...... makea a d1at1nct1on between the aimple neoeaa1t7 ot tbl 
.U. naing# an4 the oond1t10Dal neceaait7 ot the mara walld.n.g. 
God. torelmew both that the IRU1 would riae on a oerta n mornlDC<.;. 
and that the man would walk, but ne-v .. thelua the former action 
11 •••••al7 and the latter tree. La47 PhiloaophJ' doea not aq 
idlat the aimple neoeaa1ty poa1t1on would oharaeter1se the 
d1ao1ple•a viewa, but auch 1a ev1dent1J the oaae.a 
186& 
section a 
I wol nat han to do of awloh •teereJ 
M7 tale 1a ot a ook1 aa .,. •1 heere, That tok hla oon~elJ. of hS.a -qt, w1 th • ....,., 
To walll:en in the 7erd upon tbat morn 
That he hadde •t that clzteem that I 70ft tolde. 
!he atmple chaplain will not Yenture further in high 
pb11oMpb1ea1 apeeulat1on. After all, he has a tale to tell• 
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that of a cock who to h1a aorrow took the CO\Ul.ael of h1a wife, 
of one who did not accept the a4vioe gi Yen him in a d.rea. So 
enda ;the paaaage trom the IN.n' a Prieat• a Tale on d1 vine .f'ore-
Jm.oWledge and bnma» .tree w111. 
What do theae lines tell us about Chaucer• a own 
attltnlde towarda tbe prob~m we bave been atw171:ngY we know, 
.f'lrat ot all, .that be waa 1ntere.ate4 ln the problem. We know, 
that be waa cogmaan t ot the continued dlaputationa concerning 
it ln the aohoola. we know that ·he waa aoqual ... with the 
pr1Do1pal aolut1ona put t'on81"4 to aolve the prebl•• We &l'e a 
little inclined to euapeot that.be t'oun4 none o:r the aolution.-
abaolute~ oon'V'lno1~. :RonYer, it ia one ~ to beline 1J1 a 
tenet of a creed., and another to be able to explain 1 t. JPitoa 
Obauoer•a wol'ka w know that he belltWed. in ain, in 1\\Uiart 
reapomt1billtJ'1 in merit, 1n reward, and punlahment. In othell 
wor4a, he believed 1ft human tree will. JUat how tree will could. 
'be reoono1led with God' a undoubted toNknowledge, he ap,Pal'entlJ' 
414 DOt ••• cle&rl'J• Perhapa the eolut1on waa app~nt to great 
..s..ta J 1 t wa• not ao to hie. In regprd to auch profOUDd. cptea• 
tiona, l1lce h1a nun• • prieat, ve'r7 probabl71 he deoided that he 
would. "nat han to do of' awlch matere.• It waa tor- hbl to be-
lieve ln foreknowledge anc1 .. tree will and not to expla1a their 
reeono111at1on. 
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Chapter v 
THe Patr1at1o *04 8oholaat1c Anawer 
It will help greatly to understand Chaucer•• att1~~e 
toward the problem, and al.eo the plaoe the problQl itaelt baa tn 
acholaet!.c ph1loaoph7, 1t a ehart h1atoP1cal aketch of 1t be 
pvu..l The roa4el' 11111 reoall the former obapter 1n 1thlch a 
._..,. of Boetld.uata tPea-.nt waa 81v•n• It Will be well tt he 
kMp 1D m1J1d some or the genePal pointe of that ohapter wbtle 
•••UDB the following *-toh., and eapeei.allJ tlb.e taot \bat the 
I?- cou.,lat1~ Pb11oaop!a!ae •• WS.ttea 1n the eplJ' p•t ot U. 
ata• oentnu-,·, wheN&e the Bun' • Pr1eat•a !ale and -rmlu all4 
qs-tam• were oompoaed in the late 4eoa4ea ot the toua._th 
••turJ· 
The qu•tton regar41ng tbe reoono111at1.on ot tore• 
kD.owleCSge aDi fr" wtll S.a • vef!7 old one. It hu been M41tate4 
upoa b7 ..,.,. ot tlw .s.aeet .. in blat_,.. some thinking tb.ere 
waa ao poeetble meana of rooono111atioa, denied either the tore• 
lalowleqe ot 004 or the tree will of men. Cicero, Marcua., Celaue, 
ttepUJiua Parie1ene1a 4on1e4 that 004 can have torekaowle4ge ot 
f'ltee will •'•· The Fathera of the Ch'lll'oh 4e1'en4e4 the principle 
tbat Qo4 baa a perfect and oepteln foreknowledge of tree will aota • 
..-aa thea &H TC"tulllan, st. Juatin Mart:Jr, CJT11 ot Alexan4r1a• 
1\laUn• Greaor7 tM Gnat, Os-1sen and St • .Terome. Even non• 
Clarlat1an pb.lloiOphlttta, mQh aa A.IID.Ol'l1ua. Plots.nue, and Phllo 
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~ defended thla principle. a 
We have not1oM 1n Boetb1ua the ilrJportanoe whtoh the 
Pino1ple that God lmowa the put and the future aa an eternal 
l'eaent pla,-s in the reeonc111ttt1on t'4. tree will and foMknowl• 
l&e• He 1a bJ' no meane the onl.7 one who uaed th1a principle, nor 
n4eed the tint one. Th1a ))l'ino1ple 1a important beoauae on the 
De band 1 t ••••• the foreJcnowledge or God, aince 1 t penal ta God 
o ••• oel'ta1n knowledge ot what 1a in 1taelf uncertalnj an4 c 
b.e other hand., it pz-epapea the W&J" toz- aaY1ng tree w111, beoauae 
noe we ahoW that tuture tree 11111 aota are preaent to God, it S.a 
ot d1tf1cu1t to explaln how that Jmowleqe doea not neoeaa1 tate 
bla. Thoae who v.aect tbS.a pl'S.no1ple betoH Boethlua ue ON&Ol'J' 
bl (}peat and. c,r11 ot Alex8l'ldr1a, anct tlhe non..Chr1at1a wr1 tea, 
--.tua, Plotinua, and Philo. Bea14ea tmeae oan be enumerated 
'bb. .. a1ua, Ambroae, and 01'1g n.a Orif, n, 1then arguS.ns qainat 
el.aa, one ot the t1ret to propoee the d1tt1oult7 ot reoono111ns 
Cl'eii:Do1rle4ge and tree will, uaed the example of one mart beho141ns 
notb.• tall1ng lnto a hole. Aa tbe taot, be pointed out, that 
b.e _. aeea the other talllng doea not make the ta111Dg 
••••hl71 ao the tact that God hu torelmowleqe ot ov tuture 
Ne 111.11 aota doe a not make thea neoeaa&PJ J tor God knowa them 
ot •• ru~· eYenta but •• preaent onea. • .... ahall ••• , 
upat1ne too uea th1a method ot &l"gumentat1on. It should be 
et1oae4 tbat noil aU the w:ritera listed were trying to prove 
bat toreJc:anle4P doea not 1mpoae neceaa1 ty on tuture tree will 
&t 
aota, aa Or1gen waa in tbe example given. some were •ral7 en• 
4eavoring to show that God haa foreknowledge ot all things, tree 
will a4ta included. Their n&n8 1 have been given to show that tJ:wT 
wet-e acquainted w1 t· the principle. 
Another pr1no1ple which. as was shown 1n Chapter II 1 
waa ade D11Ch or by Boetbiua waa that things do not happen beoauae 
God tarelm.owa them, but He toretcnowa them beoauae thq will happen. 
Ollce 70u adm1 t that Oo4 krlowa tu ture th1ng1 as ireaent, thia 
pr1Jle1p1e 1a the next logi ca1 step. It Godt s foreknowledge of 
future tb1qa 1a the aame u out' Jo\ow1414ge ot preaent th!Dga, we 
oaa. oonclwle log1oallJ' that a future event does not happen beoauae 
Be fOI'eknowa tt, but on the oontra1'71 He Jmowa 1t beoauae it will 
Julp{>4tn, just as the event tald.ng place before • doea not happen 
'beeau•e I know it, but I lmow 1t beoauae it 1• happening. But 1t 
thla !a. so. I cannot aay that Bla foreknowledge makea the .. ent 
' 
aeoeaaar117 happc. any more tball I oan ••7 that 11t1 lmowledge 
malcH the action before me happen neoeaaarilJ'• ainoe ln both cue• 
the 1tn.o1t'1Mse preauppoa .. the extatenoe ot the o'bjeot. y_., a10h 
u.s W.a aeoond principle, IUIICm6 th• the fol.l.ow1nga arts•, 
J.._, Ohl7aoatom, Ep1phanS.ua, CJr11 ot Alexandria, st. Ana•hl, 
st. AupatJ.ae, Alexander ot Halea, and Alber~ Jlagrma. In 
aeMI'al tu u:p1lc1t interpretation o~ the principle was that the 
aot ta the •••en~al condition of the foreknowledge ot God, not 
t:.be oaue ot 1 t . 
•• .,.. now prepared to oonaider tba ll'ld1v14ual men 
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who oonts-ibute4 to the deYelopment of the acholaat1o anawer to 
the problem. The tirat w111 be st. Auguatine. He oona14era the 
~eatlon in the De 01Y1tate Del. cap. lx and x. Here he la 
oh1efl7 oonoerne4 with retukt101l of Cicero, who ln J)e DlYlnatlone 
denied that both tree will and the toreknowled&e ot God oan 1taDd.• 
aa4 who conaequent17 denied the forelalowledse ot Goct.' 
Firat ot all Ausuatine 41tferent1atea 'tJ'pea of 
nMeaalty. The neoeaaitJ of death 1a contrU'J to free will, The 
neoeaal t7 of God' a Uving d.oea not deatro7 111• tree will. •an baa 
tlle uoeaa1ty ot Willing or not willlq, wb1oh 4oea DOt d.eatltOJ' 
the freedom of the aotloa of w11Ung 1 taelt. But oonoernS.Dc thla 
utlon. doe a 1 t not haYe a .aeaai t7 wbloh 1a 1nooapat1ble wiidl 
fJtee w11lf It muat be foreaeen bJ' God, and what 1a tor•••• llUt 
happea. '!'he Stoloa thousht that what .baa a Oel'ht.Jl, fixed. ...... 
ot oauea la •••••Al'7, and in auch a wq aa to preolude fJtee 
will. Oloero had a a1m1lar belief. He argued that lt God tore• 
lmaw all th1nga. nob. a certain order of cauaea would WI'• If 
all thlnge are torelmown b7 God, ao aqa Oloero, the., will o-. 
1a tile order in whlch thtJT are foreknown to ooae, IIDd. so will 
laaYe a f1xe4 and oertatn order. · oonaequentl7 what 1a torelalown 
'b7 God must happen b7 neoeas1t7. 'l'o thla Augustine annera that 
lt 4oea not follow. that beoauae the OZ'du of the oauaea la onM.la 
• God., couecauentlJ' there ls no tree will. OW.• 11'1Ua alao are 
eaua•a, and aa auoh are a part ot that order of cautaea whioh la 
••natll to God and la oontained in Hie toreJmowled&•• But it Be 
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oan Jmow theae oauaea, s.. e. our willa, He oan alao know that s. t 
S.a their nature to act treeq, and oan know how that fl-ee aetlcm 
will take placeJ juat aa, although we muat be aware ot an aotion 
we ue pert'ornd.ng, our k:Dowlec.t.ge cloea not ma1Ee 1t neoeaaU7 that 
" pert-o:r:ra that aet1on. at. Auguatine expla1u more olearl.J' wb&t 
be •an• in hia •ne tJ,bro Arb1tno.•5 suppoae S.t 1a" trw., he 
a-pea, that the torelmowled.p or God illlPo••• neoeaatty on tuture 
tblaaa, ao ~t on thla account aa.e one would atn ot n ... ae1t7• 
It that were tJ-ue, he would ain ot neoeaaltJ' aolel7 b"auae or 
Go4' a torelalowledge. But th1a 1a abaurd, tor CJ04•a torelcnowledge 
ao mos-e 1mparta euoh a neoeaa1ty of a1nn1ng the J'O'IU' tOP.-..1• 
ed.S• would, it you were to foreknOw that IIJOmeone would a ln. uatn. 
aa J'OUI" _.,.., ot• aome aotlon of the peat doe• not btpoae 
aeoeaa1t'7 on tlbat aot1on, ao neither d.oea Oo4•a torelmoWl•&a• or 
-..future. 
ID another plaoe6 AU~W~t1ne aa,-a that 1t 1a not 
•••••UT that a man dn_ although 1t be neoeaHl"J' that God. tore• 
••• b8 w:t.ll atn. But 1t Go4 t01-eaeea ~at be w111 a1n, he ••• 
oerta1n17 will atn, beoauae Godta tOI'eknowledge earmot be 4e-
o.S.vect. OOd tor••••• the taot that the DUr1 deUber&tel.7 will 
ohooae to atn. It be did not wf.ah to atn, he would not have to 
4o eo. And 1t the man ob.oae not to a1n, GOc1 would alao toreaee 
that. In the aeoon4 book ot the l'!!••t1onea a4 81mpl1o1~ 
Aupatlne, 11111e apeak1ng ot the nature ot Oo4• a torekMwleqe, 
la7• 4cnm the pr1no1ple that God lmowa the tutiure a1 1t 1t "" 
ea 
preaent. we cannot hel.p not1o1ns how a1ad.lar 1n aar:\7 pet,aq 1a 
the treatment ot Augustine to that ot Boe1Sbiua. The lat._ .. ,
ba'Ye drawn heavil.J' on Augustine tor hia Book v.-
We 11111 now exud ne briefiy the oontztibut!.on ot. 
aoe.as.ua. He :raat la7s down the principle that God know• the 
' 
futve and past as an eternal preaent. Then ha. takea up the ob• 
jeot1• that what God forelmowa a1at oom.e to paas. OTher• at-e ft'o 
ll:la4a ot aeoeaai t7 • oond1 tional and simple • oD17 one ot wb1. ~"h la 
repuaunt to tree will. The aun•a rla1Ju1. would be an example ot 
simple neo~usa1t7• COD41t1onal neoeaa1ey ar1aea 1~ tha o•"• ot a 
- wh0J11 you _aee walkil'lgt tor what 1a known oannot be othePW'iae 
~ 1t, 1a 1mown. Thia neoeaa1t7 doea not OOIItl troa the nat~UJ:te 
ot the will aot, but .troa the a441t1cm ot a ooa:U.t1on, s. ••• , the 
b.Owlqe of the beholder. 'l'h\la 1n ltaalt the aot 1a perteotl7' 
fltee. Refened1 hOwever, to the knowledge ot the beholder • 1 t la 
neoea~arr. so t:r-ee will ao ta derive a kind ot neoeaa1 ty trom the 
Jcnowledge ot God. Th1a mceaa1tJ' 1a oommonl.7 called a111011g the 
aoholaat1oa oon41td.onal, or oonaeg,uen;a, or ~.!!foa1teJ 1&he other 
1a tel"'Ud a!!lle, or antecedent, or d1 vlde4, or absolute. MaDS.• 
im 
teatl7 Boetbiua proved on the treatment ot Augustine. 
~ . 
The next 1mportan t name tOP our consideration 1a tha• 
ot .a.uelm. In h1a "De couordia Praeao1ent1ae Dei oum L1bersate" 
b.e •nata i:he queat1on akillfull.J• The neeeaa1ty 1mpUe4 b7 the 
torelmowleclge or GOd e1gn1t1ea nothing more than that beoauae a 
thine Will e.ziat, it oannot at the same time DOt exist. .Anaela 
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oalla th1a neoesai tJ' oonaepent, and oppoeea it to the other 
neoe.aa1 ty 1 termed anteoe4ent. '1'be anteoedent moeaai t7 oomea 
before the exiatenoe ot the thing and is within ita oauaeJ the 
oon.equent neceea1ty ia BliiUltaneous with the axlatence. o£ the 
thlnc, and follows n-om ita eslatence. Be explains well the prin• 
olple that the past and I'll tuMt ta wm eternal preaent to God, show• 
lq 1ahat the tPM will aet, altb0\lf4l changeable in tt .. , la 
obDaeleaa in etern1 t7, 'beoaua . thlnga are not in etern1 ty ao• 
oordiag to ts.me. Since it ia changeless in etern1t,", Goct oflft 
biaft eternal ad" 1mau.table lcnotrl.Mge ot tt. 
Omitting William of Parl•' who wrote uoellentl:J em 
1ale question., we pua oa 1» the pril'lM ot phlloaophara aDII 
••oleslau, at. 'lbollaa Aquiu.e. He expla1na the pl"'blem lucldl:r 
tmd. oGapletelJ'• In h1a tr•1aeat we tlnd lllloh to relllnct. ua of 
Book v of Boethlua. In De VerS.tate8 st. !beMa tJella ua that 
5ben are· two ••7• 1n whicb Mn han goae wztQbC 1n tl')'lng to 
4M1de bow God Jmowe oont1~~gent be1nga. aome, Peduclng Jlia 
llaoWl•dg• to the leTel ot ours, denied that Be knowa thea at all. 
!hl• will not do 'beeauae thel'e could be no divine pl'OVldenoe ot 
._. &tfalra which are oonti.Dgent. On the other hand, aoae haYe 
aa14 that God fe&'elmon all, and that .. 1 thll'l6• happ• with 
uoeaatqo. But thla -.kH t'Pee wlll lapoaa1ble. It would l'eader 
UDJuat, punllb.•nt tOft' ala and reward top virtue. There1"ore, •• 
_., ••1 that GOd Jcn.owa all tutun th1nsa. and. doea eo w.t thout 
bl.._.1ng the event of 11117 oont1ngent be1q. Th1a Une or 
thoqht relld.nda ua of Book V of De Oonaolation.e. 
Bwor comea from. the t"aot that the object la not 
lalowa as 1t 1e. Bow nothing oan prevent a neoeaa&F,V th1J11!!! htoa 
happening• a1nce· lta oauna are s..ttably ordered to 1ta pro4uo• 
ua.. Oonaequentl.J'. neoeas&rJ things can be known w1 th cert1 tude • 
.-n een thq _.. .tuture, ••· ror U~U~~Pl•• the 1'1alng or tb• •Wl• 
-a.•t.q. ··beoauae OM oan~ lntef••· With the ao1i1on ot lta oaua•••· 
h' ._. 1t 1a aotua117 jn:10duoe4~ ita proc.\uot1on cannot be 
lalaclered, &114 on thia aooount 1t 1a posaible to have oeMain 
Jmowlqe about 1 t. Por ••IIPl•• -.. baa a oeru.t.a J~t tllat 
a .. ratea a1tl when be behold• see•atM a1tt1:a&• bOll t=Jd.a lt ta 
olear tsbat oae eaDD.Ot haft oe..s.n Jcaowle4ce about c•ttaseat . 
t4'llnsa 1n ao tar •• thq •• event• ot the tuin.artt, but lt ~.,.·are 
pea•t to bbl, be ou. Thua God can ha't'e oertaJ.a lmowledge or 
.tv.twe oont1rcent thlnsa ~· Be know thea •• lt. the7 .,.... 
..... ,. 'lh!a will be cl.__., perhape, fit• the tol.l.o'trt.q ex• 
-.1•• I ••• J1aD7 peop~ puelng .u.ooeaa1ve1J' tb.Jtouah a sa•, aNI 
-... tor BOlle t1•• BOW the paaaage ~ eaoh of theu s- opJA 1D 
-particular aoment of the tS... I stood there ... present to 
•• .... ver, the paaaaae ot al.l er thea O&llmOt 1M preeent to ... 
tt.,. Jalolrle4p .. tsoo. as..al, s. •••• 1t fill' Jmotraclge eoul4 ~14 
aU the paa~, ~aen11. ·&ld tutl.lre 1a ou ..,..laatlns peaent •*• 
J eeuld bebo14 the preeents paaeqe ot all ot them 1ft the ... 
,••••t ot tlM, and tbla deapite the tu~ that tiber d.o not all 
paaa tl:lNup the gate at the •- tiae bu' euooesal••l7• The 
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41. y1Jla knowledge ia tot. a111lll, since it is eternal, and eteMl1• 
11 ilota ai!IUlJ yet God' a knowledge embrace a all time. Since 
Wl1a la a&~ lt beholda Whatne will take place in time not aa 
t\ltulte but aa preaent. we behol4 the future aa tutu:Jte, beoauae 
we are bound 'b7 time, and 1n .time events are future to us. Aa we 
ue . aot deoe1ve4 when we behOld oont1J18ent eventa happen1ng 11'1 
the. PJ~efent, ·and. nevertb.eleaa do not by our knowledge binder thea 
tnm. J;lappent.q oonttng•tl71 eo God oan know tu~ eYenta with 
oertltru.d•• and w1 tt:out lnterters.ns With their happ.an1ng 
' 
"flttaae~tlJ' • 
.Ute tb.ia eJQt1anat1on st. ~~ ~•t•r• d1reot17 to 
Joetta1u. Boethlua• t. ,.,.., oonaiclered lt t.noorreot to apN.k 
ot the • :toremow1eq.• of God, b4toauae there 18 r•all:T no lmowl• 
qe 1rJ. Oo4 ot the ltlture •• tuture. st. Thomaa ~»xt anawva the 
o'D3eo\1oa8 la propoaed. b.t'OJ-e he entered into the loll& esplarat1on 
.J ua.t gl ven. I a theae aNtWezta he aqa a tew thlDP 'lbloh lbou14 
be actS.-.4 ure. .A future ocmt1n&8Jlt be1na ha8 AO 4etenlned 
tftth ln ltaelt, but lt ..._. haft a oauae, anc1 God. oan know tlbat 
oauae. It la uo••Ml'7• s. ••• , 1lb.e tuiNH oontlngent belq. !D the 
8eue that onoe lt 4tld8t8• 1 t oennot .at the 8... t1• not at at. 
094 know• 1t aa lt it axl8ted• ('rhia 14ea wa• noted ln treatbs 
ot St. Anaelata ~.) It le neoe8aUT1 not 1n S.taelt. but 
1a that :tt la 1mown b7 Oo4J __.•t•• 1n the ord.R ot c objeo• 
te lta oopltlOll• Wbat 18 at1'1'1bu\ed. to a th1J'll aooording to 1ta 
.-n aature 18 a part at ita being, but 'lllhat la attn'butac! t1a lt 
t.a eo tar &8 1 t la Jraown, 18 at..S.buted to 1t aooord.l~_ to the 
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nature of the lmowleqe ot 1 t. M7 1ntelleot lalowa thlnga 1m-
-ur1&U7, but t.b.ia 1mmater1al1 tr which the thing hu ia not ot 
i'aelt but ot 1111' intellect. To God a future contingent being la 
preaent and. neoeaaarr, but tbia presence and neoeaa1t7 1a not ita 
own l)ut is o1' God• a intellect. Therefore, it I aee seorawa 
Jl'\lDDS.ng, be ru.u J and 1t God. lmowa a future th1ng, that tbS n& w111 
'bel l:totb of theae are neoeaa&l"J Wbile thq are ex1at1ng, and the7 
are .as.atln& ln a aenae beoauee thq are present. 
st. tthomaa e44a .ol'e to hia trea11aent ot the pr<>bl• 
1a bla oo~~Mnt&l"J l!! reri.hel'meaelu Ar1atoteua.9 !he valuable 
utter it contain• 'ft.l'ranta ita Vanllation in fulla 
God 11 altogether outa14e the order ot time. 
Be ia ltalld1ne, as 1t were, upon the high o1UA.el ot 
uaal.teabll etemltJ'• Before BS.a 1a aprea4 out the 
eole oovee ot tiae, which Be takea 1a b7 oM elmple 
lntultloa. oonaequentl.J, b7 one aot ot v1a1cm., Be 
•••• eveJ7thS.Dg that bappeu 1n the ooUI'ee of t1aeJ 
m4 eaoh fact Be Hea u it S.a ln 1taelt1 not u ._. tJdng tlhat 1a to be preaent to Hie sa•• 1D the tt.tin~Jte, 
and. ia tor the pJteact lnvolve4 1D the aequenoe of 
oauaea on whlah 1t depend.at at the aame t1• He alao 
aeea that aequeu.oe ot oauaea. Be aeee eveJ!7 event 1D 
a anner altogether proper to 8Jl etel'Ml being. · boh 
taot, to 1fh&Mve period ot tlme S.t 'belonse, He aeea 
even aa the h't.man •7• •••• sooratea aeated. The 
a1tt1ng ltaelt, n.ot lta oauae, S.a ... b7 the ..,. •• 
· Bv.t troa the tut ot a an . aeet.as aooratea aeated., 1 t 
atat not be 1nterre4 that the sitting 1• • etteot 
tlowill& trCD ita oav.ae •••••ar11J". On the other 
hmd, the ,......... •7• •••• ••t trul7 an4 1nta1Ub1J' 
aooratea aeated. wb11at he N&ll7 1• aeate4, bHauae 
eYer7thln8, •• 1 t 1a S.n 1 uelt, 1a a t1ze4 u4 4e-
Hnd.ne4 tact. 'lhUa, then, we muat admit ~t Ood. 
Jmowa 1d.th abaolute eerta1nt.J' aad 1ntal11b111ty what-
eve ha,ppeu at aDJ' time. 11ever~leaa tnaporUT 
.veta do DOt happen of neoeaait"J't_ but are the etteota 
of oauaea that mif>ht have acted. 01Ulen1ae. 
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In the augumentlat1on ot st. Thomas Just g1Yen the 
reader oarmot help but aee Jll\lch a1Dd.lar1 t7 to the matter or the 
t1ttb. book or the De Ocmaolat1one. 
We have now g1 von br1erl.7 the patr1at1o and aohoU.t1c 
Jo1utton ot 1be probl.em ot the r•oono111s.tlon ot d1v1Jle tore• 
lmowledge anct .traaan tree wlll. Let ua now re .... rt to the 11nea 11l 
whloh Chaucer J8D11'eeta hla 1ntel'eat 1n thla problem. Aa we ..,; 
'1lhe laraentJ.Ds '!'ro1lua la 1n a state ot doubt. He tench to bell"• 
that all huan" act1ona are neo .. a1Cate4. Yet he cannot be 8UI'e, 
tor •ere are atrong argumenta on tb6 oth•r atM. M&JQ" a sreat 
ol.atk baa taught to:reor41natlcm, but J11aD7 an other hu clal-.4 
tbat aothlng co•• ot Mceu1Q'. It 11 all ve7!J oo:ntua1ng •. •so 
ale18t1e a1"'l clerlcea ol4e, t.l".l:d I ao't moe GPJ'D70Uil :t •7 ho!Ae·•lD 
A oerkln e!.Jdlaztl ty can be to\md in tb.e l'wl' a PJt1ea-tt a attl Wd.e. 
'l'll'Ue, he 1a not at aU deapa1r1ng •• is !ro1lua. But the a...-a., 
and he 1a aoqu.aln 1*1 W1 th them. or thoae who would aolve the tor.-
Jalowleqe tree w111 prob~a le••• h1a at .leaat ae.S.nglJ' UBC-.. 
Yiao..S. Such anawera ar-e contra.41otoJT. 1'be probl .. 1a appaz'e.nt• 
17 ••oluble. There haa been peat altercation 1n the acahOola, 
Ul4 peat 41aput1ng about th1a question, and eYer baa been ........ 
a Jaa:adre4 tb.w.aarui mea. J. t is too •oh ro:r h1m. Be wlll not 
h&Ye to do wltb the atte. He wtll "proceed with bia tale ot 
CbaaUoleer. 
Oertalnl.Jt. tale linea b-oa Troll:u.a and crla!J!! G4 
t.roa the Wuata Pr1eatts Tale man1~•·~ a certain aoept1o1a~ T.bia 
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scepticism does not necessarily co:,oern the cath0?l1c dog:maa 01· 
God' a fat'eknowledge and !l'!An Is .free w1 ll. It has to do rather 
with the a.rc;ur:1onts,. der'Lved from hu.t."lan reasor,, W"ieh !'1en have 
brought forward to show that there is no repugnance between ~uch 
foreknowledge and .free will. Whence comes this aceptioal attitude 
of mind which Chaucer• s characters display? It does not come 
trom Boeth1us, mom, as we have seen,. Chaucer followed closely. 
rt doftll not co:·,e from the illustrious fathers and scholastics 
whose views we hnve briefly sketched. The historical resume haa 
shown that they were well agreed on the whole matter. The work 
of one develops and completes that of the other. What shall we 
say then of the Nun•1 Priest's hundred thousand clerks and their 
wranglinga? 
Perhaps the history o.f those mediaeval philosopher1, 
known as "Nom1nal1sts" will throw sorie 11g)lt upon the matter or 
Chauoer•s attitude. ~ccording to Petav1us, leading Nom1nal1sta,ll 
a ch ns William Occam, Gabriel Biel, and : ;rep.:ory R1m1n1, did not 
hesitate to declare unsoluble the proble~ of the reconc1llat1on 
of God•s f,Jreknowlec.1.ge and man•s t·ree will. '.L'heir views were 
sufficiently current in Chaucer•a time, so that he could have been 
aoquainted w1 th them. 
Monsignor Pohle r~.,.tnds ua12 thRt the death o£ Duns 
Sootua. marks the close of the golden era of the scholaat1o system, 
am that the period 1300-1500 represent& its deol1ne. What thia 
period accomplished 1n constructive work consists in oreservinr, 
and digesting the results o.f the former age. 
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lt..altaneoua 111 t~ this good labor are ele;,~enta or d1a1ntep-at1on, 
4UI partl7 to the t&lae 14eaa of mJst1o1aa of the Frat1oell11 
partl7 to the aberat1ona and aupert1o1al1 tea of the HOJI1nal1ata, 
am partly to th• 41atr•••1ng oontUc;t of ohUJ'Oh and atat.. '!'be 
development ant! rapid spread ot JJOid.nallam. ln BDgland at l8 aat, 
.ut be aaol'1be4 malnl7 to W1111aa Occa, who d1 ... 111 1K'7. 'I'M 
tueta ~ xomS.ultaa were well Jmown 1n England in the last 
4Ma4ea ot the fOQl'teenth oentu17• when Cb&Uoal" eote zro11u 
P4 C£1
3
88lJ!I aD4 the JfUnf a rrte•t' a Tale. A.a the Jrowtnaltata 
..S.ata1ne4 that the toreaowlqe•t••• td.ll probl• waa tuo1\lble, 
1t _,.be that thelr teuhing f1J:&4a an echo 1n tM aoept1oal 
raualca ot Chaucer• a oharaot••• 
Perhaps another a()UitCe of Usht oa Cuuoar' a a•tttud.e 
1a to be tou.n4 in the teaohlng of Blabop ~. Mfe....S. to 
ltJ' tJ:ut BUn'• Pr.leat, tosetbe with All8Wit1ne •4 Boetb1ua, u a 
ntllorlt7 on the queat1-. ot the HOOAC1Uat1on ot foNDowlqe 
U4 IN• 11111. B~• aa born. about 1170 1ll ton.4on. ad 
41 .. la the aame oltJ' about the 780 l.M9. Be atta1ne4 ,....,. 
t... u a theologS.a. Bla isheologS.oal leoturea, dell veNd at 
o.t.a, were ..,_484 into hla .f&a~Gua treatise on sraoe, eatltlecl 
1lt IM'I Rd !!IE• £•61119 et 4e v1£tllte oaul£9!! 111 fill 
•••nan•••• Arter holding v&rS.oua prOIId.nent oftlcea in the 
ebV'Oh an4 state, be waa aa4e .b'Obbiahop or can.terbuJ7 1n 1569, 
the 7e&r ot hla 4eath. Hia ~ reputation aa a aoholar na 
'buecl not ofl17 on the theoloaioal treatiae meationect, but on hla 
'10 
ma'Cbwaatical worka aa we11.13 
Aa R· Seeberp: ~vea it, the sum of BradWIL1'41ne' a 
theolop:ioal teaohl.llS!: 1a aa followat 
GOd ia COJIQ;)le te per fee t1on and soodneaa, ia Sood 
action itself• free trom the potent1.alltj ct S:m-
perteo1d.Dil• He 1a no' ·Uid.·te4 llJ' 11Nltal1 't7• Jle .i.a 
tne first oauae, the absolute principle ot being 
IUld JD.Otioa. 'lbel'etore. DO one t.lan aot, nor oan 
&n:Jthina "bappa" J God works or Glide!' a •••nta. . 
· D1•1ne toftlaloW1e4ge 1a will uero1•e4 1ons ~ore. 
01' prede•t1nat1on ot (Ml'l' a) will. Go4t • w111, 
.no"f'8r1 1e unoban&t.~· Evet7tb.lns Hkea place ~ 
virtue ot the 1D1'1Utable .antecedent neoeaa1 tJ' oauaed 
b7 tM 41 vtae vo11 tlon. senoe man can aq nothiftl 
••" u.aeful or ett1oac1oua • • • than ' th7 will 'be 
4ou• t • The .rr.-ta et. pre4eat1nat1cm are the gittl 
ot sr••• ln the present, juat1t1oat1on froa a1n, 
....., fit .-it., ._. .. .,_.~• to the en4, and t~DeD41Jll 
b11aa in Ul8 'world to oo.. The reault ot th1a 11ne 
ot thoqht 1•t· of c .. out!' .. , 4aterm1n1aa ot a ~at4o 
t7P8• !Jl apl-. of tbia ~~ BM4War4inei H-
Auauat1u. uaerted the reality of tree wil • 
With auch 4etenasntatto teaoh1Jll( ourrent in En&lalld .... and 
Ohauoer app.rentl.J' knew aolll8tbl~Sg of BradWAI'd1De and hla 'teaohi.Dg 
.... it 11 Uttle wonder that the traditional dootr1ne o£ the 
father• a4 aoholaaUo• abould be ob•oured. Apparentl,. too. 
there ia aoae r ... on. tf:r the loept1o1• man1.feete<l b7 Tro1lua 
and the }lunt a Pl'ieat. 
1. Thie Jlla.tter ot tbla hiator1e&l aketoh 1s taken ~rgel.J' 
from the following bookea 
iamt1o !heolo~, by Dionysiua Petaviuo, S.J., new 
&h, V81. !~Book IV, co. VI.YYTt, (Parle, V1Yea1 1886)• 
God!. H11 n'U~ B•MM•t 84 Attribuha, l»7 Jla&r• Joiei& Pili1~apt b,- &t!iur 'reua•,. (!t. t:ou1a, Harder, 
ltll}, PP• 181-34'1. 
•• ot. worn •nt10De4 above. 
3. Ot. Petav1ua, l.o., PP• 164 ff. 
-
t. cicero, J!! D1vU.t1one, II, '1. 
a. ~ Ubeto pb1tr1o, er...- y·rt an4 IV· 
a. De Gratia Obriatl, Lib• I, Oap. III• 
v. mx ·1¥'• c7;• umver., par. III, eap. xv. xn. 
a. ~ ver1tat.e, e41td.o nov~ !'urtn, Jlaretu, 1931• Q..tt,Art.tUI 
•· ,. v .. lat.t.Oil 11 Mken r.oa ... ~ 'lbeolol' W • ......_ 
&oe44er, s.J •, ('lew YorJt. LOn&'iini, diae~ a oo. a lilt) 1 
PP• 1'71478 .. 
10. ~U.U.. &lid Orl!!df.- IV, IJ'I8,.9'71. 
u. ct. ,....,.1ua. page 166. 
oac .. Uo J!1U8!eJ!!1&1 Vol. XIV, P• &98. 
&bl4•• P• 81S. 
'!'be Wew -~-IMP.1~-a Of l•ff!!ou.a ~~ tli'l 'f'IR; ·~ ~ ~ x-,t m: ~,. •~ 
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chapter n 
conolua1on 
The purpoae ot th1a •hea1a waa to .xud.ne Vle vi .. a 
espreased 1n the worka ot Ohauoer on the aubjeot of 41Ylne tore• ·· 
knowledge and buman tree will, .with r.tereDOe, eapeclallJ, .to the 
••••• ot Boethiua an4 to the teaohl.ng ot the Pathera aD4 the 
aobolut1o wntera ot the Catho11o Churoh •. Thla taak baa now 
'bea aooolfPU&bed, and 1t 1a to be hoped. that the Chauco1an 
paaaqea in which auch v1ewa are expressed have been made eo•• 
wbat .,.. 1rltell1s1ble. 
It 1a Nroeaaa1'7, t1naJ.17. to ma up, and perhapa to 
a.p11fJ, wnat h .. alre.., been aa14 reaar41ng chaucer•• ow.a 
attitude to the problea ot the reoono111at1on ot God'• t~l­
edl• and man•• tree w111. Firat ot all, 1t llUat be akte4 bt 
~Ubtedl.7 Chaucer, aa a Oathol1o bel1eYe4 in the exlat-.e bftilll 
ot 41 vine torelmowledge and human tree will. 'M&n7 paaaas•• 1n 
thepoet• a wrka oould be o1te4 to S.lluatrate h1a bellet aot cm17 
1a aa all•lalow1ng God, l:R.tt alao 1n auoh atattera aa a1n, l»\Mil 
reapoD81b1UtJ', •r1t, and reward, all ot wh1oh !.mpl7 the edat-
enoe ot tree will 1n man. Moreover. ••en the Jfom1ul1ata of 
Obaue• a time, and Bishop Bra4wu-41ne, thougt their ph11oaopla.• 
1oal -.peeu1at1ona were ratblr &WJl7, proteaaed their b•l1et ln ba• 
lla1l tree will. 
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But, aa we have aa1d, there la a certain aoeptiolam 
41apla7ed in the linea of 'l'l'011ua am cr1ae,l4e and the :wun• a 
Prleat' • Tala wh1oh we have exud.ned. Th1a aoept1c1am 4oea not 
oonoem, so 1 t aeema to ua, the dogmas of toreknowled~e and tree 
will. It haa to do rather w1 th the arguments, d.rawn from. human 
peaaon, which have been brought torwar4 to llhow their non• 
repuplll'lee. Even allowing tor the taot that what Ohauoer• • 
oharaotera aq need not retleot the 1ntelleotual oon.1o tiona ot 
thea oreator, at111 1 t 1a hard to eaoape ·the 1mp:reea1on that the 
poet blmeelt regarded the 1'oJtelmowle4ge•tl-ee Will problea u a 
•or• et IIJ"Btel7, aometb1ng not to be aolv..S to ">M' a coaaplete 
aat1ataot1on, ft'O b7 the areateat or clerks. It JDa7 well 'be 
that Chaucer waa 1ntlueno«t 1n h1a vine on tbta au.bJ••• b7 \he 
\eaob1ng ot the 1fOJI1nal1ataJ or that the rather d.etei'Jdn1at1o 
pb11oaoph)" ot •n like Btahop Bnd.waN.!ne (Who neftl'tbeleaa aaln•· 
•at•4 their ballet in bee wtll) obac,.e4 tor him the ta-.utlrm.al 
paw1at1c and. eoholaatio aolut1on. 
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